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Abstract 
This study examines how the tax treatment of corporate tax-deductible restricted share units 
and employee tax-favoured stock options at the employer and employee level affect the 
extent of their use in executive equity compensation packages among public firms.  I appeal 
to two theories, namely, corporate tax planning and managerial power, to address the 
research question.  I hand-collect executive compensation data of 143 top non-financial 
Canadian firms traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange for the 2005-2015 period.  I find some 
evidence that firms expecting a high tax rate use the proportion of executive equity 
compensation via corporate tax-deductible RSUs to a greater extent compared to firms 
expecting a low tax rate at the vesting year.  The results are consistent with the inference that 
managers demanding a higher level of employee tax-favoured options in their total equity 
compensation when they have power to influence the executive compensation.  The results 
also support that managerial power weakens the positive association between firms expecting 
a high tax rate at the vesting year and the use of corporate tax-deductible RSUs in executive 
equity compensation.  The findings suggest that tax policy that artificially distinguishes 
among types of equity compensation, such as the current Canadian legislation, affects 
executive equity compensation design. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
“Among the many factors that must be taken into consideration in determining 
an appropriate compensation package for executives, one of the most important 
and complex is taxation. The tax treatment of each element of the compensation 
package may have a significant impact upon the overall compensation package. 
Of course, while attempting to avoid creating an excessive tax burden for the 
executive who receives the package, the employer will also seek to optimize its 
own contribution from a taxation perspective.” (Stikeman Elliot 2014, p. 37) 
 
“The mix of cash, equity and other forms of compensation must be consistent 
with risk alignment.  The mix will vary depending on the employee’s position 
and role.  The firm should be able to explain the rationale for its mix.” 
(Financial Stability Forum: FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, 
p. 3) 
 
1.1 Motivation 
An executive compensation package consists primarily of cash compensation (salary 
and annual bonus), stock option-based grants, and share-based grants, which are subject to 
different tax rules.  In Canada, cash compensation is immediately tax-deductible from the 
corporate taxable income at the employer level and taxable at the employee level.  Among 
option-based grants, at-the-money stock options are widely used, and compensation expenses 
related to such grants are not eligible for corporate tax deduction at any point in time. At the 
employee level, only half of the gain from at-the-money stock option exercises is taxable as 
employment income at the exercise date (hence, known as “one-half deduction”).   Among 
share-based grants, 100 percent of the realized value of restricted share units (RSUs) and 
performance share units (PSUs)1 satisfied with cash payment or repurchased shares is 
                                                   
1 Restricted share units (RSUs), also known as phantom units in Canada, are the rights to receive shares or the 
fair market value of the shares granted to employees with a vesting period of a maximum of three years (Geddes 
2010; Lee 2010; Colquhoun et al. 2012).  Performance share units (PSUs), similar to RSUs, vest based on 
predetermined performance measures (Geddes 2010; Lee 2010; Colquhoun et al. 2012). 
 2 
included in computing taxable employment income, and an equivalent amount is deductible 
from corporate taxable income (hereafter called “corporate tax deductible RSUs”) upon the 
vesting of these shares.  Thus, at-the-money stock options are more tax-favoured to the 
employees (hereafter called “employee tax-favoured stock options”) than share-based grants 
for a dollar of pre-tax benefit.   
Stikeman Elliot (2014) suggests that the differences in tax treatment of each component 
of the compensation package may affect the executive compensation design.  Prior studies 
(e.g., Matsunaga et al. 1992; Klassen and Mawani 2000) also find some effects of taxes on 
cash and equity compensation structure; however, these studies predate certain changes in 
financial reporting rules and an increasing trend of RSUs in executive compensation 
packages. As of 2004 in Canada, accounting rules require employers to report employment-
related stock option grants using the fair value method.  As a result, the structure of equity 
compensation changed from primarily stock options to a mix of RSUs and stock options.  As 
shown in Figure 1, Canadian employers in my sample use a mix of tax-deductible RSUs 
(25% of total annual compensation on average), and employee tax-favoured stock options 
(21% of total annual compensation on average) in current executive compensation packages.  
Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 2, 2004-2005 compensation packages consisted primarily 
of stock options and shifted to increased use of RSU grants in later years (2010-2015) from a 
mere 10% to 50% of total equity compensation.2  Therefore, renewed research is necessary to 
understand how various factors influence the current equity compensation structure.  In this 
study, using a unique Canadian tax setting, I investigate how differential tax treatments on 
employee tax-favoured stock options and corporate tax-deductible RSUs affect the executive 
                                                   
2 This compensation structure change is also observed in the U.S. (Carter et al. 2007; Aboody and Kasznik 
2008; Frydman and Jenter 2010; Murphy 2012). 
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equity compensation structure by examining two factors, corporate tax planning and 
managerial power.  I further examine whether managerial power mitigates firm-specific 
corporate tax planning.    
[Figure 1 is about here.] 
[Figure 2 is about here.] 
Canadian tax rules on equity compensation, particularly those on stock options, have 
been at the center of tax policy discussions in recent years (e.g., Geddes 2009; Crosbie et al. 
2015; Liberal Party 2015; Tedds 2015).  In 2017, the federal Liberal Party attempted to 
repeal the stock option deduction allowance, which many termed as a “stock option 
loophole” (Scotti 2017) and has been described as too generous to the highly paid executives 
(Tedds 2015).  Additionally, it has been proposed that corporate tax-deductible RSUs are 
inefficient because it is difficult for firms to meet requirements for corporate tax deductibility 
in order to use these instruments in compensation packages (Geddes 2009).  Although taxes 
at the employer and employee levels are accepted as important considerations in structuring 
executive compensation packages by practitioners, prior research provides limited evidence 
on the implications of Canadian tax rules on executive equity compensation structure.  This 
study, therefore, provides valuable evidence to the tax policy discussion and the effect of 
employer and employee taxes on corporate compensation decisions.   
1.2 Corporate Tax Planning and Executive Equity Compensation 
Extant literature shows that firms determine the mix of compensation elements, such as 
cash and equity, based not only on equity’s motivational effects but also on their tax and 
financial reporting incentives (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001).  For example, using Canadian 
data, Klassen and Mawani (2000) find evidence of a trade-off between tax and financial 
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reporting incentives in corporate option granting behavior.  Prior to 2004, Canadian 
accounting rules allowed firms to use the intrinsic value method3 to recognize option-related 
compensation expense, which implied that at-the-money or out-of-the-money options result 
in no expense on income statement, thereby allowing firms to increase their pre-tax income 
by compensating managers with such options.4  The increased reported pre-tax income also 
produced forgone tax deductions because stock option compensation was not tax deductible 
at the corporate level at any time.  Using this unique Canadian setting, Klassen and Mawani 
(2000) show that when a firm’s earnings are below target, the firm uses stock option 
compensation to a greater extent to avoid charging compensation expense against earnings, 
consistent with the financial reporting incentives hypothesis.  In contrast, when a firm’s tax 
paying status is high in the grant year, the firm uses a greater level of tax-deductible cash 
compensation, consistent with the tax incentives hypothesis.   
However, the above-mentioned studies predate financial reporting rules introduced in 
2004 and the wide-spread use of RSUs in executive compensation packages.  As of 2004, 
Canadian financial accounting rules require employers to report expense on employment-
related stock option grants using the fair value method.  Since that time, the structure of 
equity compensation among Canadian firms has changed from primarily of stock options in 
1993-19955 to a mix of RSUs and stock options in the 2006-20156 period, as shown in Figure 
                                                   
3 Under the intrinsic value method, the option value at the grant date is the difference between the market value 
of the underlying stock and the exercise price of the stock option.  Since the market value of the underlying 
stock at the grant date is the same as the exercise price of at-the-money stock options, the intrinsic value of the 
stock option at the grant date is zero. 
4 Similar change in financial reporting standards incurred in the U.S. effective June 15, 2005. 
5 Stock options accounted for 60 percent of total compensation (see Klassen and Mawani (2000), Table 2, 
p.238) in the 1993-1995 period. 
6 All types of RSUs account for 27 percent of total equity compensation, and stock options account for 21 
percent of total equity compensation in my sample. 
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2.7  Therefore, renewed research is necessary to understand how tax policies affect Canadian 
firms in determining the current equity compensation structure after the option expensing 
rule removes the financial incentive for stock option compensation.   
Taxation is a highly important element in structuring compensation packages 
(Stikeman Elliot 2014), and this is especially true in Canada because of the corporate tax 
reporting disincentives of stock options by Canadian tax rules.  As taxes affect the after-tax 
cost of the equity compensation to the employer and the after-tax value of the equity grant to 
the employee (Katuščák 2009; Widdicks and Zhao 2014), differences in tax treatment of 
RSUs and stock options provide employers and employees with tax planning opportunities.   
Similar to other tax regimes (such as U.S. tax regime), Canadian tax rules allow 
corporations’ reported operating losses to offset positive pretax income reported in the prior 
three years resulting in tax refunds. Any unused portion of losses can be carried forward up 
to 20 years to offset future positive taxable income.  Therefore, corporations’ expected 
marginal tax rates, defined as the present value of the change in future tax payable for an 
additional dollar of current taxable income, may range from zero to the highest statutory tax 
rate.  In contrast, executives’ marginal tax rates are typically the highest of the personal 
statutory tax rates because their annual cash compensation is sufficiently high. Thus, 
corporations have a higher incentive to engage in dynamic tax planning than executives.    
To demonstrate the effect of expected corporate tax rates on the cost of various equity 
grants, holding the after-tax value of equity grants to the employee constant at $100 and 
using the 2015 top marginal personal tax rate (49.5%), Table B.2 of Appendix B shows that 
for Canadian companies, the difference in after-tax costs of granting tax-deductible RSUs 
                                                   
7 This compensation structure change is also observed in the U.S. (Carter et al. 2007; Aboody and Kasznik 
2008; Frydman and Jenter 2010; Murphy 2012). 
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and employee tax-favoured options ranges from −$6 (=$27−$33) to $65 (=$98−$33) when 
the expected corporate marginal tax rate decreases from 36% to 0%.  In contrast, as shown in 
Table A.3 of Appendix A, there is no such difference in the tax cost of granting different 
equity instruments in the U.S. because U.S. tax rules on equity grants do not significantly 
differ across RSUs and employee stock options.8  The takeaway from the numeric examples 
in Appendix A is that the after-tax cost of corporate tax-deductible RSUs decreases with 
increasing marginal tax rates due to differential tax treatments on equity compensation in 
Canada and that employee tax-favoured stock options grants are costly to firms facing a high 
marginal tax rate.  Therefore, I assert that firms consider the degree to which compensation 
offers a tax shield when determining the mix of executive equity compensation and minimize 
the after-tax cost of hiring their senior management.    
1.3 Managerial Power and Executive Equity Compensation 
In estimating the after-tax cost of each equity component, corporate tax planning  
implicitly assumes that managers are indifferent between tax-deductible RSUs and employee 
tax-favoured options when after-tax payouts are expected to be the same.  In reality, 
managers may perceive that equity compensation packages containing stock options are more 
valuable than packages containing restricted shares, holding the cost to the employer the 
same (Hodge et al. 2009).9  If managers are able to influence the executive compensation 
structure as managerial power theory contends, and managers find stock options more 
valuable than restricted shares – as the survey conducted by Hodge et al. (2009) shows – the 
                                                   
8 Under U.S. tax regime, both option and share-based equity grants are tax-deductible at the employer level, and 
all realized gains from these grants are included in employment income at the employee level.  I discuss tax 
consequences of equity grants in the U.S. in Chapter 2. 
9 This difference in perception is contradictory to economic theory, which assumes that managers discount the 
Black-Scholes value of stock options due to a greater degree of risk associated with stock option grants.  The 
authors (Hodge et al. 2009) suggest that this difference in perception is due to employees’ optimism towards a 
firm’s future growth. 
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compensation package likely contains a greater proportion of stock options because managers 
perceive these to have the highest value.   Therefore, I hypothesize that the proportion of 
stock options in the executive equity compensation mix increases with managerial power.   
Literature on the effect of taxes on executive compensation design is silent on the 
trade-offs that managers face.  For example, when firms are expecting a high marginal tax 
rate, are managers willing to relinquish their own interest to reduce firm’s effective tax rates?  
Prior literature (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Dyreng et al. 2010) contends that top 
executives are under pressure to reduce the corporate effective tax rate.  Therefore, it is likely 
that the negative effect of managerial power on the use of tax-deductible RSUs is mitigated 
when firms are expecting a high marginal tax rate.  In contrast, when firms are facing a low 
marginal tax rate (specifically, less than 32.9%), both managers and firms should prefer 
employee tax-favoured options to corporate tax-deductible RSUs as shown in Inequality (2), 
derived based on Table B.1 (see Appendix B).  Hence, I argue that the effect of managerial 
power on the use of employee tax-favoured stock options differs across corporate tax 
statuses. 
1.4 Summary of the Main Findings 
To test my hypotheses, I collect the executive compensation data of 143 non-financial 
Canadian firms included in the Toronto Stock Exchange 200 Index for the period 2005-2015. 
The testing sample consists of 138 non-financial firms for the period 2006-2015.10  My 
sample includes both family-owned and non-family owned firms.  For further testing of the 
hypotheses, I use a subsample of non-family owned firms for two reasons.  First, the power 
relationship between the board and family member executives is more complicated to capture 
                                                   
10 Some firms did not disclose compensation data of all top five executives prior to 2008.  Firm-years without 
compensation data for all top five executives were dropped from my sample. 
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among family-run firms.11  Second, as explained in Chapter 2, family member executives 
may not be eligible for 50 percent deduction of stock option exercises in computing 
employment income.   
I use the RSU ratio, computed as the fair market value of executives’ corporate tax-
deductible grants divided by the sum of the fair market value of executives’ corporate tax-
deductible grants and the Black-Scholes value of executives’ stock option grants, as a proxy 
for executive equity compensation structure.  Controlling for firm-level cross-sectional 
differences, I examine the association between the RSU ratio and proxies of corporate tax 
incentives and managerial power using both the full testing sample and a non-family owned 
firm subsample.  Using an OLS model, I find evidence consistent with both corporate tax 
planning and managerial power hypotheses. The evidence does not support that managerial 
power mitigates the effect of corporate tax planning on executive equity mix.   
As a specification check, I estimate a fixed effects model.  This firm-specific fixed 
effects model provides an implicit control for firm-specific omitted variables, such as 
investors’ preference for upward potential but not downside risk and peer (e.g., U.S. firms) 
influence on the compensation structure, which affect the proportion of corporate tax-
deductible RSUs in executive equity compensation mix.  Test of the hypotheses using the 
fixed effects model is considerably more supportive of the hypothesis that the effect of 
corporate tax planning on RSU ratio weakens with increasing managerial power using 
observations of non-family run firms, indicating managers’ self interest in maximizing their 
own wealth.  The evidence does not support the corporate tax planning hypothesis.  
Additional analyses using the expected marginal tax rate as an explanatory variable also 
                                                   
11 See García-Ramos and García-Olalla (2011) for a detailed discussion on corporate governance differences 
between family run and non-family run firms. 
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show that the positive relation between the corporate tax-deductible RSUs and corporate tax 
rate weakens among firms with weak boards of directors across all subsamples.  These results 
imply that Canadian tax policy on executive compensation has a stronger effect on executive 
equity structure among firms with relatively weak corporate governance and Canadian tax 
policy should not be subsidizing firms with relatively weak corporate governance. 
1.5 Contributions 
This study contributes to the extant literature and practitioners’ discussion in several 
ways.  First, prior literature on the impact of taxes on executive compensation examines the 
trade-off between financial reporting and tax reporting incentives prior to mandatory stock 
option expensing (e.g., Yermack 1995; Klassen and Mawani 2000), firms’ employee option 
cancellation behavior (e.g., Matsunaga et al. 1992; Mawani 2003), and the decision to grant 
stock options (e.g., Bird 2018).  I contribute to this stream of literature by revealing the 
impact of future tax incentives of share-based grants at the employer level and option-based 
grants at the employee level on the executive equity compensation structure using ex ante 
corporate tax rates.  
Second, this study contributes to prior research documenting the effect of managerial 
power on executive equity compensation design (e.g., Yermack 1995; Gerakos 2010; van 
Essen et al. 2012; Abernethy et al. 2015; Bird 2018).  My research adds insight into the 
determinants of an equity compensation structure by examining the direct impact of 
managerial power in choosing employee-preferred stock options, indicating that managerial 
power is an important factor, incremental to the firm-specific economic factors as contended 
by the optimal contracting theory.   
Third, my research also adds some insights to the debate on the effect of investor level 
 10 
taxes on corporate decisions.  Graham’s (2003) review on taxes and corporate finance argue 
that the effect of investor level taxes on corporate policies is mixed.  Since managers hold a 
considerable portion of a corporation’s shares, managers are super-investors in a sense, and 
thus, manager level taxes are similar to investor level taxes.  My research complements the 
studies (e.g., Amiram et al. 2017) that examine the level of corporate tax avoidance in 
imputation countries, where taxes at the corporate level are incorporated into the investor 
level as tax credits to lessen double taxation, by testing the effects of “shareholder-manager” 
and corporate level taxes on compensation decision in Canada, an imputation country. 
Additionally, my findings have potential implications to tax policymakers, academics, 
and compensation consultants in Canada. The risk-focused executive compensation package, 
which links the executive compensation and risk outcome, is regarded as the cornerstone of 
current compensation practices, as advocated by the 2009 Financial Stability Forum 
Principles (FSF).  Therefore, the compensation decision should be based on risk and outcome 
incentives, and not on tax incentives.  Because tax regimes are slow in making changes to 
align with current compensation practices, policymakers, academics, and compensation 
consultants in Canada are concerned that tax policies encouraging employers to use one 
equity grant over the other may hinder firms from structuring risk-focused compensation 
packages (e.g., Geddes 2009). Given the scarcity of empirical evidence on the effect of taxes 
on shares and options mix in executive compensation, my research provides stakeholders 
with some empirical evidence of how tax treatment differences affect managers’ equity mix, 
which is used to strengthen the link between executive compensation outcome and risk 
outcome, the main focus under FSF Principles (Geddes 2009). 
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1.6 Outline of the Study 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The introduction chapter (Chapter 1) 
provides a general motivation for the study, discusses the reasons for choosing the tax 
policies and managerial power effect on the executive equity compensation, outlines the main 
results of the studies comprising the dissertation and offers the contributions of this study.  
Chapter 2 provides a summary of the Canadian tax rules on various types of executive 
compensation components including cash compensation.  Chapter 3 provides a 
comprehensive literature review, including both the effects of tax implications and 
managerial power on the general executive compensation level and form. This literature 
review focuses on the tax accounting research before the introduction of the new financial 
reporting rules on stock option compensation expense (circa 2005).  Studies of managerial 
power on a general level of executive compensation are addressed in a separate section 
within Chapter 3.  Chapter 4 develops the hypotheses for this dissertation study.  Chapter 5 
describes the research design, which includes the development of corporate tax planning and 
managerial power proxies.  Chapter 6 explains the sample selection, discusses the findings, 
and provides additional tests. Chapter 7 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
Tax Rules on Executive Compensation 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss tax consequences of each component of an executive 
compensation package at both the employer and employee levels under current Canadian Tax 
regime.  An executive compensation package generally consists of cash (salary, annual 
incentives and cash bonus), option-based grants (e.g., at-the-money stock options, stock 
options with tandem stock appreciation rights, standalone stock appreciation rights), share-
based grants (e.g., restricted shares, performance shares, RSUs, PSUs), post-retirement plans 
(e.g., deferred share units or “DSUs”, pensions), and perquisites (Murphy 2012; Bird 2018).  
These compensation components are subject to different tax rules.12  In the first part of this 
chapter (Section 2.2), I describe the tax consequences of a typical cash compensation 
package and general deferred tax grants.  The second part of the chapter (Section 2.3) 
describes the tax consequences of option-based compensation.  The third part of the chapter 
(Section 2.4) details the tax consequences of share-based compensation.  The fourth and final 
part of the chapter summarizes and discusses the differences in tax treatment between the 
option and share-based components emphasized in prior sections.  The chapter concludes by 
describing why Canadian tax setting provides a unique opportunity to address the effect of 
taxes at the employer and employee levels on corporate compensation policies. 
2.2 Tax consequences of cash and deferred tax compensation 
Typically, half of an executive compensation package consists of cash salary and 
                                                   
12 This dissertation does not cover DSUs, pensions and perquisites, which are trivial in proportion compared to 
other components.  Thus, this chapter does not discuss the tax consequences of these compensation instruments. 
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annual cash bonuses (“cash compensation”).  Cash compensation becomes taxable 
employment income at the payment date and a corresponding amount is deductible from the 
corporate taxable income, subject to applicable anti-avoidance rules. 13    
Meanwhile, the remaining half of the typical executive compensation is comprised of 
deferred tax instruments, such as share-based and option-based grants.  These deferred tax 
instruments become taxable when employees exercise option-based grants, restrictions on 
share-based instruments lapse, or certain performance criteria are met.  In the following two 
sections, I discuss the tax consequences of option-based and share-based compensation.  
2.3 Tax consequences of option-based equity compensation grants 
The majority of option-based grants include at-the-money stock options, standalone 
stock appreciation rights (“SARs”), and stock options with tandem stock appreciation rights 
(“TSARs”). 
Employee stock options (At-the-money or out-of-the-money stock options). An 
executive stock option is a contract, which gives employees the right, not the obligation, to 
purchase shares of their employer at a predetermined price, termed the exercise price, prior to 
the stock options’ expiration date, which is typically about 10 years from the grant date (Hall 
and Murphy 2002).  The employees must hold the employee stock options for a pre-
determined length of time before they are permitted to exercise the options.  This required 
holding period, the vesting period, is usually 3-5 years (Tedds 2015).  Any compensation 
paid in the form of the stock options becomes taxable when the employees exercise the 
                                                   
13 Paragraph 6(1)(a) requires employment-related cash compensation to be included in employment income at 
the payment date, and subsection 37(9) allows the employer a tax deduction of the corresponding amount 
subject to some anti-avoidance rules (see Section 245 for details.).  In Canada, such rules have been in place 
since 1986 (Lee 2010).  In the U.S., firms are subject to a maximum of $1 million tax deduction for the non 
performance-based compensation (i.e., salary) of each of the top four executives and the CEO (Hall and 
Liebman 2000). 
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options and the amount taxed is computed as the difference between the fair market value of 
the shares at the exercise date and the exercise price pursuant to paragraph 7(1)(a).14   
At the employee level, the taxable employment income from the option-related grant is 
only 50% of the difference between the fair market value of the shares at the exercise date 
and the exercise price, as provided under paragraph 110(1)(d) subject to some necessary 
conditions.  The conditions to be met are: (1) the exercise price must not be lower than the 
fair market value of the share at the grant date; (2) the employee must have at an arm’s length 
relationship15 with the issuer of the shares; and (3) the shares must be prescribed shares.  At 
the employer level, under current rules in paragraph 7(3)(b) of the Income Tax Act of Canada 
(The Act), at-the-money or out-of-the-money option grants are not tax deductible at any time.  
Hence, Canadian employee stock options are considered employee tax-favoured 
compensation instruments (Stikeman Elliot 2014; Geddes 2010).  The tax treatment of stock 
options in Canada is unique and considered one of the most generous tax treatments at the 
employee level.  This type of stock option, known as at-the-money stock option, is a 
prevalent form of equity grants among Canadian firms.  Based on the sample of firms 
included in this study, data suggest that employee tax-favoured stock options account for 
20.5% of the total compensation in Canada.   
Stock appreciation rights (SARs) and tandem stock appreciation rights (Tandem 
SARs or TSARs). Stock appreciation rights (SARs) are similar in incentive structure to stock 
                                                   
14 Incentive stock options in the U.S. These options are subject to special tax treatment.  Employees receive 
capital gain tax treatment for the gain on the exercise of stock options.  However, these options are no longer 
popular in the U.S.  Since nonqualified stock options account for 95% of employee stock options in the U.S. 
(Hall and Liebman 2000; Frydman and Molly 2011), this study assumes that all stock options granted in the 
U.S. during the proposed sample period are nonqualified stock options.  The detail of their tax treatment will not 
be explained in this study. 
15 The Act defines an arm’s length transaction as follows.  An employee and the corporation may not be 
considered at an arm’s length if he/she owns more than 10% of the shares of any class of the corporation 
through his/her related persons, such as family members.  Therefore, I also conduct analyses using non-family 
run firms where transactions between executives and corporations are likely to be at an arm’s length. 
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options.  The employee gets a payment in cash or shares equivalent to the stock price 
appreciation over a predetermined period.  SARs are generally used to limit the dilution from 
the issuance of the shares that occurs with the exercise of employee stock options.  In lieu of 
receiving shares, a tandem SAR allows an employee to elect cash payment equal to the 
spread between the exercise price of the option and the fair market value (Geddes 2010).  In 
Canada, for stand-alone SAR plans, employers receive a tax deduction for cash or 
repurchased share payouts whereas the SAR grant is 100% taxable at the employee level.  
The employees may receive a one-half deduction only if the employer agrees to forgo the 
corporate tax deduction. 16  SAR plans are not frequently used in Canada and account for 
only 1% of the total compensation for my sample firms.  Thus, my analyses do not include 
SARs and TSARs. 
2.4 Tax consequences of share-based equity compensation 
The term share-based equity compensation in my dissertation refers to restricted shares, 
performance shares, RSUs, and PSUs, which are used prevalently in compensation packages.  
Tax consequences of share-based compensation can be found in the paragraph 7 of the Act. 
Restricted stocks. The employee who receives a restricted share cannot resell the share 
for a specified period of time.  Employees do not typically pay for restricted stocks.  Thus, 
restricted shares are in effect stock options with zero exercise price (Lambert and Larcker 
2004) and are subject to a vesting schedule.  In the case that an employee leaves the 
employment prior to vesting, the employee forfeits their restricted stock.  If an employee’s 
shares fail to become vested, employers may refund any amount employees have paid to their 
employers for the restricted stocks, subject to the conditions stipulated in the compensation 
                                                   
16 In U.S., tax treatment on SARs are the same as that of stock options or RSUs, that is, the employers get a tax 
deduction at vesting, and the employees pay income taxes on 100% of the SAR grants.   
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contracts.  In Canada, at the employee level, a restricted share grant immediately becomes 
taxable at the grant date, regardless of the resale restriction.  At the same time, employers 
may not claim a tax deduction on restricted share grants at any time.  Non-deferrable tax on 
potentially forfeitable assets makes restricted share plans unpopular in Canada (Geddes 2010) 
and practitioners and employers perceive this type of equity grant as costly to both the 
employer and employee.  In my sample data, restricted shares account for only 2% of the 
total executive compensation (see Figure 1) and as shown Appendix B, Table B.2, the cost of 
using restricted shares is higher than all other equity instruments (see Panel C vs. Panel A & 
Panel B) when the expected marginal tax rates at vesting year range from 0% to 36%. 
Restricted Share Units (RSUs) with payout in cash or repurchased shares. Restricted 
share units (RSUs) are similar in nature to restricted shares.  One significant difference is that 
actual shares are not issued at the grant date under a typical RSU plan. Instead, one unit of 
RSU delivers a share or cash equivalent of a share to the employee at vesting, at which point 
in time the RSU grant becomes taxable.  The amount taxable to the employee is the market 
value of the shares at vesting, less any amount the employee paid for the shares.  A typical 
RSU plan does not require employees to pay for the shares; therefore, RSUs are technically 
options with zero exercise price.  Since the exercise price is lower than the fair market value 
of the share at the grant date, RSU grants are not eligible for the 50% deduction stipulated in 
paragraph 110(1)(d). Instead, the employee pays taxes on 100% of the RSU grant and the 
employer receives a tax deduction for RSU grants, which are delivered in the form of cash or 
shares repurchased in the open market to the employees at vesting.  Post the option expensing 
rule adopted in 2004, the use of tax-deductible RSU grants has increased in Canada.  In my 
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sample for the period 2005-2015, data suggest that tax-deductible RSUs represent 25% of the 
total executive compensation (Figure 1). 
2.5 Difference in Tax Treatments Between Share-based and Option-based 
Compensation  
In summary, Canadian firms receive an equivalent tax deduction for the RSUs and 
PSUs with payout in cash or repurchased shares, and standalone SARs with a cash payout.  
In contrast, employers do not receive tax deductions for grants of stock options, restricted 
shares, RSUs, or PSUs that are fulfilled with treasury or newly issued shares.  At the 
employee level, at-the-money stock options are the most tax-favoured among all equity 
compensation instruments because only half of the gain from a stock option exercise is 
taxable at the exercise date (known as “one-half deduction”).17  The employer’s and 
employee’s combined tax cost of equity compensation of restricted shares is the highest in 
Canada because employers are not eligible for a tax deduction at any time, and employees are 
required to pay tax on the RSUs at the grant date without any deferral advantage of equity 
grants.   
In contrast, the U.S. tax rules are fairly neutral on equity grants.  All equity-based 
compensation grants are tax-deductible at the employer level whereas employees are required 
to report all equity grants as employment income at the vesting date (exercise date) for share-
based grants (option-based grants).  Section 83 of the U.S. Tax Code stipulates the tax 
treatment of restricted stock.  At the employee level, restricted stock grants are taxed at 
vesting by default.  By making a Section 83(b) election, employees can elect to pay tax on 
restricted share-based employment income at the grant date.  The employer gets tax 
deduction equivalent to employment income, on the date the employee chooses to declare 
                                                   
17 The1984 federal budget introduced this provision, paragraph 110 (1) (d) of the Act. 
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their income, i.e., either at vesting or at grant date.  Employees pay taxes on restricted share 
grants at the grant date if they choose a Section 83(b) election.  The Section 83(b) election is 
not available for equity-based compensation paid in the form of RSUs.  Employers never get 
a tax deduction for granting incentive stock options in the U.S. (Graham 2008), which is very 
similar to the tax treatment of at-the-money regular stock options at the employer level in 
Canada.  Since nonqualified stock options account for 95% of employee stock options in the 
U.S. (Hall and Liebman 2000; Frydman and Molly 2011), this study assumes that all stock 
options granted in the U.S. during the proposed sample period are nonqualified stock options.  
As a result, the tax costs are similar across all equity instruments as shown in Table A.3 of 
Appendix A. 
Based on tax consequences at the employer and employee level in Canada, as 
previously discussed, I categorize equity compensation into three distinct groups as shown in 
Figure 1.  The first group consists of instruments that are tax deductible at the employer level 
(25 percent of total compensation) and are ineligible for one-half deduction (or 100% 
taxable) at the employee level.  Since the majority of RSU grants are corporate tax-deductible 
I use the terms “tax-deductible RSUs” and “RSU grants” interchangeably.  Furthermore, I 
use the term RSU grants to capture RSUs and PSUs settled with cash or repurchased shares 
at the vesting date and cash settled SARs.   
The second group consists of instruments that are non tax-deductible at the employer 
level (20.5 percent of total compensation), and are eligible for one-half deduction at the 
employee level, i.e., at-the-money employee stock options and SARs that are fulfilled with 
shares (hereinafter called “employee tax-favoured options” or “option grants”).   
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The third group consists of employment-related equity instruments that are neither tax 
deductible at the employer level nor eligible for “one-half deduction” at the employee level.  
Specifically, these instruments are restricted shares, RSUs and PSUs that are fulfilled with 
newly issued or treasury shares are not tax-deductible.  This group accounts for only 
approximately 2 percent of total compensation in my sample and is not generally consistent 
with an efficient tax planning hypothesis; therefore, I will exclude this type of equity 
compensation in my tests.   
2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I discuss the differences in tax treatments among equity compensation 
instruments.  Based on the tax consequences at the employer and employee levels, I 
categorize the equity instruments into three distinct groups: corporate tax deductible RSUs, 
employee tax-favoured stock options, and non corporate tax-deductible RSUs.  I also provide 
the composition of these instruments as a percentage of total compensation.  Furthermore, in 
Appendix A, I analyze the estimated tax cost to the employer of each equity grant by 
applying current Canadian tax rules.  It shows that the difference in the costs of equity grants 
changes with the expected corporate marginal tax rate under current Canadian tax rules on 
equity-based compensation, but not under the U.S. tax rules. This suggests that the Canadian 
tax institutional setting is better suited relative to the U.S. setting to test the effect of taxes on 
the structure of executive equity compensation. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I introduce extant research that is pertinent to my thesis.  Two main 
themes are important in my work: corporate tax planning and managerial power.  The 
existing literature generally appeals to two theories influencing the design and level of 
executive compensation: optimal contracting theory and managerial power theory.  Optimal 
contracting theory, a more traditional view, contends that equity-based compensation keeps 
an executive’s incentive level within an appropriate firm-specific range determined by 
shareholders’ value maximization (Core and Guay 1999; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Murphy 
2002).   Managerial power theory contends that managers extract rents by influencing the 
compensation policies that determine the level and form of executive compensation, and that 
optimal contracting theory alone is inadequate to explain the determinants of executive 
compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk and Fried 2003; 2005).  The remainder of this 
chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 reviews the literature on the determinants of 
executive compensation literature in tax accounting, financial accounting, and finance based 
on optimal contracting theory.  Section 3.3 discusses the literature that examines the effect of 
managerial power on executive compensation.  Section 3.4 concludes this chapter by 
providing the contributions of this study to the extant literature. 
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3.2 Studies Based on Optimal Contracting Theory 
3.2.1 Archival Studies in Tax Accounting Research 
The Scholes-Wolfson’s framework, which is a variation of optimal contracting theory, 
suggests that a firm’s behavior (determinants of compensation structure) can be explained by 
considering all parties (e.g., both the employer and the employee), all taxes, and all costs 
(e.g., financial reporting and agency costs) (Scholes et al. 2015).  Under this framework, 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) contend that a firm determines the mix of various 
compensation elements based on tax and financial reporting incentives at the employer and 
employee level.  Consistent with their conjecture, Mawani (2003)18 and Klassen and Mawani 
(2000)19 show that tax and financial reporting incentives influence stock option cancellation 
and stock option grants among Canadian firms. Since stock option grants in Canada are not 
tax-deductible at any time, firms must forgo tax deductions in order to achieve the financial 
reporting benefits of not expensing option grants prior to 2004, which indicates that the 
unique Canadian institutional setting is ideally suited to observe a firm’s choice based on 
such trade-offs between the tax and financial reporting incentives.  
Primarily using U.S. data, another stream of tax accounting literature examines the 
effect of tax policy changes on executive compensation. According to tax theory, tax 
considerations, such as differences in tax deductibility at the employer and employee level 
and the length of tax deferral of compensation elements, affect the structure of executive 
compensation (Frydman and Molly 2011; Hall and Liebman 2000; Scholes et al. 2015).  
However, some studies find no such relation between tax rate changes and compensation 
                                                   
18 Matsunaga, Shevlin, and Shores (1992) investigate the disqualifying of employee stock options using U.S. 
data, which is similar to the study of Mawani (2003). 
19 Yermack (1995) and Matsunaga (1995) examine a similar objective using U.S. firms’ data and U.S. tax 
policies.   
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design.  For instance, Hall and Liebman (2000) examine the effect of U.S. tax reforms in the 
1980s on the structure of executive compensation and find no evidence that tax changes 
influence stock option grants. In contrast, using the Canadian 2010 tax reform as an 
exogenous shock, Bird (2018) explores the effect of taxes on executive compensation by 
examining the effect of changes on the aggressive practice of stock option tax deductions on 
compensation structure in Canada.  Prior to 2010, some firms took a tax deduction and 
executives took a “one-half deduction” on tandem stock options.  However, such “double-
dipping” was never the intended objective of the tax policy and most firms did not engage in 
such activity.20  In 2010, the tax policy explicitly prohibited this double-dipping.  My study 
complements Bird (2018) by examining the combined effect of both stock options’ “one-half 
deduction” and the corporate tax deductibility of RSUs on equity compensation structure and 
how this tax planning is influenced by executive power. 
3.2.2 Archival Studies in Financial Accounting Research 
Research regarding the use of stock options in executive compensation tends to focus 
on the effect of financial reporting incentives and changes in shareholders’ taxes on firms’ 
equity compensation structure using U.S. sample firms.  For instance, Carter et al. (2007) 
find that the predominant use of stock option grants prior to the passage of SFAS 123R 
(FASB 2004) can be explained by financial reporting incentives.  Conversely, Aboody and 
Kasznik (2008) suggest that the observed growth in restricted shares is followed by the 2003 
dividend tax rate reduction—an exogenous shock.  Because the value of stock options 
decreases with dividend payouts, managers paid with stock options should prefer share 
repurchases to dividends.   Since restricted shares are dividend protected, managers are more 
                                                   
20 Only 28 firms out of TSX 600 firms used TSARs during the sample period of Bird’s (2018) study.   
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likely to authorize the payout of dividends when they are paid with restricted shares (Irving et 
al. 2011).  Therefore, restricted shares help align shareholders’ preference for dividends with 
managers’ preference post-2003.21  On a related issue, Babenko and Tserlukevich (2009) 
show that firms prefer stock option grants to fixed cash compensation because stock options 
provide higher tax savings for firms in the U.S. 
3.2.3 Analytical Studies on Determinants of Equity Compensation Structure 
Using theoretical models, researchers investigate the relative merits of share-based and 
option-based compensation (e.g., Feltham and Wu 2001; Hall and Murphy 2002; Lambert 
and Larcker 2004; Oyer and Schaefer 2005; Widdicks and Zhao 2014).  Based on different 
assumptions incorporated into the agency models, inferences on the optimal form of equity-
based compensation are mixed.  For instance, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and Lambert and 
Larcker (2004) find that options are generally more efficient in incentive alignment than 
restricted shares because the perceived value of options is higher to optimistic employees 
than that of restricted shares.  Meanwhile, Kadan and Swinkels (2008) show that bankruptcy 
risk is positively associated with share-based compensation and options are better suited for 
firms where such risk is not a primary concern.  In contrast, Hall and Murphy (2002) find that 
restricted stocks work more efficiently than stock options when the equity-based 
compensation is used to substitute cash compensation, and stock options generally dominate 
restricted stocks when incentives are granted on top of existing pay packages.  Incorporating 
tax considerations, Widdicks and Zhao (2014) show that incentive stock options are less 
                                                   
21 If I use a U.S. control sample group in future research, the U.S. control sample should also be in the 
2005−2015 period, which ensures that the 2003 reduction in dividend tax rate in the U.S. does not the affect the 
firm compensation policies. 
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efficient than restricted shares in U.S. regardless of corporate tax rates.22  While most models 
predict that firms should prefer one form of equity grants to the other, empirical evidence and 
the preliminary data in this study suggest that firms use a mix of option-based and share-
based grants in current compensation practice (Bird 2018; Carter et al. 2007).   
Some theoretical papers also examine the determinants of the share-based and option-
based compensation mix; however, they commonly assume that firms can theoretically use 
both shares and options in their compensation mix despite few firms doing so prior to 2000.  
For example, Feltham and Wu (2001) find that share-based compensation is optimal when 
the manager’s effort does not increase the firm’s operating risk, and option-based 
compensation is optimal when the manager’s effort changes both expected stock price and 
the firm’s operating risk.  Accordingly, the authors contend that mature manufacturing or 
retail firms and regulated firms are more likely to use share-based grants whereas young, 
high growth firms are more likely to use option-based grants.  Consistently, Boyle et al. 
(2011) find that a firm’s volatility influences the mix of equity compensation.  Specifically, 
they find that firms with higher stock volatility use a greater proportion of stock options with 
the authors attribute to the value of stock options increasing with volatility.  
Since there is little difference in tax treatments among equity compensation 
components in the U.S. setting (see Chapter 2), or variation in the U.S. corporate or personal 
tax rate over the past 15 years, the above-mentioned literature on executive compensation 
mix neglects the impact of taxes.  As shown in Figure 3, U.S. corporate tax rates have not 
changed (mainly at 40%) during the sample period (2005-2015).  In contrast, the combined 
                                                   
22 Taxation of incentive stock options is similar to that of at-the-money employee tax-favoured options in 
Canada. Incentive stock options are not prevalent in the U.S. (Hall and Liebman 2000; Frydman and Molly 
2011). 
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provincial and federal corporate tax rate in Ontario, Canada gradually declined from 36.12% 
to 26.5% during the sample period.  
[Figure 3 about here.] 
3.3 Studies Based on Managerial Power Theory 
Another approach for understanding executive compensation focuses on the influence 
of managerial power.  While not as prevalent as the research on optimal contracting theory 
(Bebchuk et al. 2002), academic research on managerial power contends that managerial 
power shapes the level and composition of executive compensation packages (e.g., Bebchuk 
and Fried 2003; 2004).  Thus, compensation packages may not help align the agent-principal 
interests, as maintained by optimal contracting theory.  Managerial hegemony theory, a 
variation of managerial power theory, asserts that directors are not true representatives of the 
shareholders as assumed by agency theory (Hermanson et al. 2012).  This theory suggests 
that outside directors often join the board at the recommendation of management and rely on 
management for company and industry information.  Since the boards and executives are not 
entirely independent, Hermanson et al. (2012) argue that to some degree directors are 
unlikely to challenge management’s compensation.  Thus, Bebchuk et al. (2002) suggest that 
board structure and ownership structure affect managerial power.  Consistent with this 
conjecture, prior studies (e.g., Abernethy et al. 2015, Gerakos 2010; van Essen et al. 2012) 
use board structures, such as board size and percentage of insiders and ownership structure to 
determine how much influence management has on the board.  
Consistent with the managerial power theory, prior literature finds evidence that 
managers use compensation packages to extract rent from shareholders.  For example, 
managers’ equity compensation via tandem stock option grants decreases post-2010 
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following tax policy change in Canada, implying that managers were over compensated with 
tandem stock option grants prior to the 2010 tax policy change (Bird 2018).  Similarly, there 
is an association between stock option grants and favourable stock price movement 
(Yermack 1995), indicating that managers influence such “timely” option grants in their 
favour.  Abernethy et al. (2015) find that the CEOs have power to influence the choice of 
performance measures used to access their performance, which is attached to performance-
vested stock option plans, suggesting that managers can choose a performance target lower 
than the market performance.  Conversely, Gerakos (2010) does not find evidence supporting 
a positive association between CEO power and the level of pensions.23  Therefore, 
accounting research provides mixed evidence on whether managerial power affects 
compensation design that is intended to align the agent-principal interests.  My study adds to 
this line of research by examining the direct effect of managerial power on corporate 
compensation policies in a unique Canadian tax setting where managers and firms face 
differing tax incentives as previously discussed. 
3.4 Conclusions 
In summary, this chapter reviews research that examines the various explanations for 
observed executive compensation design.  It also distinguishes two competing themes that 
attempt to explain executive compensation.  Almost all studies in this review, irrespective of 
how they explain the observed compensation design, have yet to comprehensively consider 
whether (and in which direction) managers’ self-interest affects the compensation design in 
the presence of corporate and executive tax incentives.  I extend this line of research by 
considering the effect of both managerial power and tax planning based on Scholes-
                                                   
23 See Frydman and Jenter (2010); Murphy (2012), van Essen et al. (2012) for a detailed review describing the 
influence of managerial power on executive compensation, mainly in terms of managerial rent extraction. 
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Wolfson’s framework on executive equity compensation structure in a Canadian setting 
where tax incentives are distinct among different types of equity compensation.  
Additionally, I further examine whether managers can successfully demand their preferred 
equity component when managers’ and firms’ preferences (and/or tax incentives) differ. 
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Chapter 4 
Hypotheses Development 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I develop testable hypotheses appealing to two competing themes 
reviewed in the previous chapter.  The chapter begins by describing how corporate tax 
planning affects the structure of executive equity compensation in Section 4.2.  Section 4.3 of 
this chapter relates managerial power to the equity compensation structure to the extent that 
managers’ preference for stock options is high.  Section 4.4 expands on how managers’ 
preference for one equity form weakens the effect of corporate tax planning on executive 
equity compensation structure.  Section 4.5 concludes with a summary of the chapter. 
4.2 Corporate tax planning hypothesis 
A more traditional perspective of prior literature asserts that firms increase 
shareholders’ value by engaging in corporate tax planning.  By reducing corporate taxes 
payable, corporations reduce resources transferred to the government, thereby maximizing 
after-tax cash flows and profits, and increasing the residual claims for the shareholders 
(Scholes et al. 2015).  Empirical evidence also supports that U.S. firms use executive stock 
options and restricted share grants to gain future tax benefits when executives exercise their 
option grants (e.g., Babenko and Tserlukevich 2009) or when restricted share grants vest 
(Blouin and Carter 2010).  Based on this traditional value-enhancing view of corporate tax 
planning,24 I argue that firms optimize tax payable by compensating employees with tax-
                                                   
24 This traditional view has been challenged by findings in recent studies.  For example, Desai et al. (2007) 
argue that corporate tax planning decreases firm value because some corporate tax planning provides venues for 
rent extraction by the insiders and decreases shareholders’ wealth.  Consistent with the theory advanced by 
Desai et al. (2007), Desai and Dharmapala (2009) do not find significant relation between tax avoidance and 
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deductible cash or equity grants when firms face higher marginal tax rates, holding the 
expected value of compensation to the employees the same.25       
A typical share-based plan in Canada, such as a tax deductible RSU grant, becomes tax 
deductible to the employer when the grant vests; however, stock options are not tax 
deductible by the corporation at any time.  Because these two equity instruments are subject 
to substantially different tax treatment at the employer level, Canadian public firms have the 
opportunity to reduce future tax payable at the vesting year by using corporate tax-deductible 
RSU grants rather than non tax-deductible employee tax-favoured stock options.  Therefore, I 
posit that when a Canadian firm expects a high marginal tax rate in the vesting year, its 
incentive to use tax-deductible RSU grants increases relative to a firm that expects a low 
marginal tax rate, which results in a greater ratio of RSU grants to total equity compensation 
and leads to a change in the executive equity compensation structure.   
In Appendix A, I provide a tax incentive model demonstrating the change in after-tax 
cost of tax-deductible RSUs with varying expected corporate marginal tax rates.  As shown 
in Table B.2 of Appendix B, the cost of tax-deductible RSU grants in Canada decreases with 
increasing expected corporate marginal tax rates, whereas the cost of employee tax-favoured 
stock options does not change with expected corporate marginal tax rates.  Therefore, to 
reduce the cost of executive equity compensation (and increase after-tax profit and firm 
value), employers can choose to grant a higher level of tax-deductible RSUs relative to non 
tax-deductible stock options (employee tax-favoured options) when the value of the RSUs’ 
                                                                                                                                                              
firm value, except for well-governed firms, indicating that tax planning does not always increase firm value as 
hypothesized in prior literature.  This study does not cover the consequence of corporate tax planning, that is, 
firm value.  
25 Prior literature (e.g., Matsunaga et al. 1992; Klassen and Mawani 2000; Mawani 2003) examines the use of 
tax deductible cash compensation when firms face higher tax status. 
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tax deduction is higher at the vesting.26  I contend that expected corporate marginal tax rates 
in the vesting year conceptually affects the executive equity compensation structure as a 
result of the differences in after-tax cost of equity grants to the employer in Canada.  Using 
the ratio of corporate tax-deductible RSUs to the sum of corporate tax-deductible and non 
corporate tax-deductible employee tax-favoured stock option grants (hereinafter “the RSU 
ratio”) as an operational variable to represent the executive equity compensation structure, I 
hypothesize as follows: 
H1: The RSU ratio is positively related to a Canadian corporation’s expected 
marginal tax rate. 
While I predict that firms engage in a tax optimization strategy when structuring 
executive compensation packages, there are reasons why firms may not do so.  First, tax 
considerations may not be a primary determinant of executive equity compensation structure.  
Agency theory suggests that shareholders expect the board to use a carefully considered 
executive compensation package to ensure that agents do not engage in opportunistic 
behavior (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  From an agency theory perspective, a firm’s 
compensation committee considers compensation risks and adverse incentives and provides 
the agents a risk-managed equity compensation mix (Hermanson et al. 2012).  Second, the 
Scholes-Wolfson framework suggests that efficient tax planning accounts for all parties, all 
taxes and all costs (Scholes and Wolfson 1992; Scholes et al. 2015).  If the cost of incentive 
misalignment, such as a deviation from firm-specific optimal incentive level (Core and Guay 
1999), exceeds the joint tax benefits gained in the vesting year, employers may not use equity 
compensation in corporate tax planning.  Third, employers often use compensation packages 
                                                   
26 I assume at this point that both RSUs and stock options are equally efficient in aligning shareholders’ and 
manager’s interest and have no variation in indirect costs, such as monitoring costs, except the after-tax direct 
costs to the employer. 
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that are similar to their peers to attract executive talent, which may dominate tax 
considerations in structuring compensation packages.  A firm’s compensation practice may, 
therefore, be isomorphic among industry peers.  Accordingly, I may not observe an 
association between expected marginal tax rates and the executive equity compensation 
design.  
4.3 Managerial Power Hypothesis 
I next address whether managerial power is related to executive equity design. While 
agency theory suggests that executive compensation packages are structured to align 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests (Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976; van Essen et 
al. 2012), managerial power theory suggests that managers are able to influence their own 
compensation package; therefore, compensation packages may not be able to alleviate the 
agency problem (Bebchuk and Fried 2005; Bebchuk et al. 2002).  Managerial hegemony 
theory complements managerial theory by suggesting that boards are, on average, closer to 
top executives than to the shareholders and reliant on management for company and industry 
information (Hermanson et al. 2012).  As a result, boards are more likely to side with 
managers (Hermanson et al. 2012; Bebchuk et al. 2002) and may not challenge managers’ 
demand for excessive compensation or the form of compensation (Hermanson et al. 2012) 
that favours managers’ after-tax payout. 
In a Canadian tax setting, tax consequences of stock options at the employee level may 
be a strong explanation for managers’ preference for stock options over restricted shares or 
restricted share units.  Specifically, the favourable tax treatment of stock options at the 
employee level (“one-half deduction”) is one very large attraction of stock option grants in 
Canada and some news outlet even called this generous tax treatment at the employee level 
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as a “stock option tax loophole” that favours highly paid executives (e.g., Scotti 2017).  
Therefore, I argue that “one-half deduction” will be attractive to tax savvy highly 
compensated executives if executives do not expect that the firm will grant substantially 
higher pre-tax value of RSU grants to compensate for the executives’ tax hit.  Such 
expectation violates the maintained assumption in Scholes-Wolfson framework and explicit 
in Table B.2 (that generates H1).  If one holds the pre-tax $1 value of options or shares the 
same, I expect managers would prefer stock options.  In addition to the one-half deduction of 
stock options, the tax deferral length of stock options is more flexible than RSUs.  Most 
RSUs vest in three years (Geddes 2010; Lee 2010; Colquhoun et al. 2012), whereas a typical 
stock option expires in 10 years (Hall and Murphy 2002).  By choosing stock option exercise 
date prudently, managers may be able to use stock options for their personal tax planning and 
defer their employment-related income taxes longer.   
Employee optimism may also be one of the explanations for managers’ preference for 
stock options.  A survey by Hodge et al. (2009) suggests that managers do not understand 
how to value stock-based compensation and managers’ perceived values of stock options and 
restricted shares are vastly different from firms’ valuation.  Using participants who are most 
likely to join mid-level management ranks, Hodge et al. (2009) find that managers are more 
likely to value stock options higher than the Black-Scholes value, a finding echoed by Devers 
et al. (2007), and restricted shares lower than its fair market value.  These survey findings 
imply that managers	prefer $1 fair value stock option compensation to $1 fair value restricted 
shares in the U.S. setting where there is essentially no taxation difference between the two. 
Therefore, on the expected value of the equity grants, there is a deadweight loss that arises 
between the value perceived by the recipient and the cost to the grantor (Hall and Murphy 
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2002).  Differences in perceived value may arise due to managers’ optimism of their 
employer’s future performance or managers’ preference for a potentially large gain from 
stock option exercises despite a small probability of achieving such a gain (Spalt 2013; Sun 
and Widdicks 2016).  Combining employee optimism, a highly tax favourable nature of stock 
options at the employee level, and a longer length of tax deferral, I argue that employees may 
likely favour stock option grants to corporate tax-deductible RSUs. 
If managers can influence the board as the managerial hegemony theory contends, the 
executive equity compensation may consist of a greater portion of stock options that are 
perceived as more valuable and tax favourable to employees, leading to a change in executive 
compensation structure when the board is weak.  Assuming executive compensation equity 
grants consist of corporate tax-deductible RSUs and employee tax-favoured stock options 
only, I expect a negative association between managerial power and the RSU ratio in Canada.   
I posit the second hypothesis as follows:  
H2: The RSU ratio is negatively related to managerial power among Canadian firms.  
While executives may have the power to influence their compensation package, there 
are several reasons why they may not demand more stock options in their equity 
compensation. First, stock option grants are associated with “bad reputation” because the 
public and the government allege that stock option grants lead to excessive risk-taking, and 
managers engage in stock option backdating to extract rent (Chen et al. 2006; Geddes 2009; 
Hall and Murphy 2002).  Fama (1980) argues that CEOs know that labour market discipline 
might impose costs on managers that are aggressive in extracting rents by downgrading their 
human capital value.  Second, the economic theory argues that managers discount the Black-
Scholes value of the stock options, which is the cost to the firm, because of suboptimal 
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diversification of managers’ wealth and risk-averse agents (Hodge et al. 2009).  Therefore, 
risk-averse managers discount the Black-Scholes value of stock options due to a greater 
degree of risk associated with stock option grants as prior research suggests.  Therefore, 
employees may potentially prefer less-risky corporate tax-deductible restricted share units.  
For these reasons, I may not observe the relation proposed in hypothesis two.    
4.4 The effect of managerial power on executive equity mix across corporate 
tax status 
This section addresses whether managers have power to negotiate with firms and 
demand a higher level of employee tax-favoured stock options, despite potential corporate 
tax disincentives, thereby affecting their executive equity compensation structure.  When a 
firm expects a high marginal tax rate, the Scholes-Wolfson framework of multilateral tax 
planning suggests that the tax deductible RSUs become more tax efficient and employers can 
reduce the after-tax cost of equity compensation by granting a greater level of tax deductible 
RSUs to its executives.27   When managerial power is sufficiently high, managers may be 
able to capture some or all of the firm’s tax savings by receiving extra equity compensation.  
This extra equity compensation may be in the form of tax deductible RSUs or employee tax-
favoured options.  If managers prefer to capture the tax savings in the form of employee tax-
favoured stock options because, as discussed in Section 4.3, managers value $1 fair value of 
stock options more than $1 fair value of restricted shares, I expect a negative interaction 
effect of managerial power on the relation between the RSU ratio and corporate tax status 
(expected marginal tax rates).  My third hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
                                                   
27 The level of tax deductible RSUs may not be 100% of total equity grant because of firm’s tendency to use 
stock options to motivate employees to accept risky projects with positive net present value.  Empirical 
evidence implies that stock options are considered better suited to motivate risk-averse managers by providing 
incentives to take more risk on behalf of risk-neutral shareholders (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002).   
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H3: The RSU ratio and a Canadian corporation’s expected marginal tax rate is less 
positive in the presence of increasing managerial power.  
While theory suggests that the relation between RSUs and corporate marginal tax rates 
weakens with increasing managerial power, there are reasons why I may not observe this.  
Prior literature suggests the importance of achieving optimal corporate tax benefits and prior 
studies (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Dyreng et al. 2010) posit that high-level 
executives get pressure from shareholders to reduce the firm’s effective tax rate.  Therefore, 
when the corporate tax rates are expected to be high, managers may forego their preferred 
stock option grants in favour of tax-deductible RSUs to increase future tax benefits and 
reduce effective tax rate.  If so, the incremental effect of managerial power on the RSU ratio 
may be undetectable in my data when firms are expecting to have a particularly high 
corporate tax rate. 
Conversely, under the Scholes-Wolfson framework of multilateral tax planning, the 
employer and employee jointly optimize the tax benefits at the expense of the tax authority 
(e.g., Matsunaga et al. 1992; Mawani 2003).  When the corporate tax incentive (i.e., marginal 
tax rate) is expected to be sufficiently low, both parties are better off by granting more 
employee tax-favoured options than tax-deductible RSUs, as shown in Table B.2 of 
Appendix B.  Taken together, managerial power may appear to dominate corporate tax 
incentives in determining the equity mix when firms are facing low corporate tax rates. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I posit three hypotheses to be tested in subsequent empirical analyses.  I 
present my first hypothesis in support of a relation between corporate tax incentives and 
executive equity compensation structure.  I present the second hypothesis in support of a 
 36 
relation between managerial power and executive equity compensation structure.  I present 
my third and final hypothesis in support of a mitigating effect of managerial power on the 
relation between corporate tax incentives and executive equity compensation structure. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Design 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I describe all aspects related to the operationalization of dependent and 
independent variables.  In Section 5.2, I outline how I construct a proxy for executive equity 
compensation structure, the primary dependent variable.  This proxy is consistent with how 
other studies measure the proxy for an overall executive compensation structure, such as the 
ratio of cash to total compensation.  In Section 5.3, I describe how I operationalize expected 
corporate tax incentives, a key independent variable.  Specifically, I report two proxies that I 
use for corporate tax planning, how I simulate ex ante corporate taxable income and how ex 
ante corporate marginal tax rates are computed.  I also include the detailed algorithm I use to 
simulate the proxies.  Section 5.4 describes how I operationalize the proxy for managerial 
power, the other key independent variable.  In Section 5.5, I provide the empirical model that 
is used to test Hypotheses 1 through 3.  Empirically, I test the model using OLS method, 
bootstrap, as well as firm fixed effects in the next chapter.  In Section 5.6, I describe 
rationales for control variables that prior literature finds are associated with the dependent 
variable.  Overall, this chapter includes seven sections including this introduction and a 
conclusion. 
5.2 Measurement of the dependent variable: RSU ratio 
I construct a proxy for the executive equity compensation mix (hereafter “the RSU 
ratio”), for testing H1, H2, and H3 as follows: 
𝑹𝑺𝑼_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 	= 		 𝑹𝑺𝑼	𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒋,𝒕𝑹𝑺𝑼	𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 + 𝑶𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏	𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒋,𝒕	 
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The numerator of the RSU ratio is 𝑹𝑺𝑼	𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒋,𝒕, which is the grant date fair value of RSUs 
and PSUs settled in cash or repurchased shares granted (i.e., the total grant date value of tax-
deductible RSUs) to executive 𝑖 of firm 𝑗 at grant year 𝑡.  The denominator of the RSU ratio 
is the sum of 𝑹𝑺𝑼	𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 and 𝑶𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏	𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 , which is the Black-Scholes value of 
employee tax-favoured stock options granted to executive 𝑖 of firm 𝑗 at grant year t.   
I hand-collected the grant date fair value of RSU grants and the Black-Scholes value of 
employee stock options granted to each executive from the summary table of annual 
executive compensation, which is available in the management information circulars. I read 
the stock-based compensation plan section of the management information circulars (and 
annual reports) to identify whether the RSU grants are satisfied by cash, repurchased shares, 
newly issued shares, or treasury shares.  If the RSU grants are described as to be satisfied by 
cash or repurchased shares at a vesting date, I classify these grants as corporate tax-
deductible RSUs.  I also read the stock option plan section of the management information 
circulars to confirm that the employee stock options are granted at-the-money or out-of-the-
money and hence, are tax-favoured at the employee level.  The majority of the option grants 
are at-the-money stock options.  Prior to 2008, firms are not required to disclose the value of 
stock options and shares granted, therefore few companies report the number as well as the 
value of stock options and shares granted.  If these values are missing, I check the annual 
report.  Most firms disclosed the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants and fair value of 
share-based grants in their annual reports.  If these values were not disclosed, the grant date 
value of the stock options was estimated by applying Black-Scholes as suggested by Noreen 
and Wolfson (1981), which also accounts for dividend payments, if any.   When there is 
insufficient information to compute the Black Sholes of stock option grants, I dropped these 
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observations.  I calculated the values of share-based grants as the number of share-based 
grants multiplied by the share price at the end of the grant year.28   
Some firms grant standalone stock appreciation rights (SARs) or SARs together with 
stock options (tandem SARs or TSARs) in which case employees can choose to exercise 
SARs or options.  Following Mehran (1995), I assume that SARs and options should have 
similar values.  I also assume that the tandem stock appreciation rights (TSARs) provide no 
additional value to the recipients.  I classify SARs and TSARs separately and exclude the 
observations with SARs and TSARS from my analysis. 
5.3 Proxies for corporate tax planning  
In this section, I explain trichotomous measures of corporate tax status at the grant year 
and marginal tax rates, which are often used in the literature as grant date corporate tax 
planning proxies.  I next describe how I modify and develop corporate tax status and 
marginal tax rates for the vesting year, which are used as explanatory variables for corporate 
tax planning in this study.  
1) Section 5.3.1 describes trichotomous measures of corporate tax status at grant year 
(“Proxy 1”) as suggested by Plesko (2003), Shevlin (1990), Graham (1996) and 
Klassen and Mawani (2000). 
2) Section 5.3.2 describes trichotomous measures of corporate tax status during vesting 
period to capture a firm’s corporate tax planning using the expected corporate tax 
status of vesting years (“Proxy 2”).  
3) Section 5.3.3 explains ex ante marginal tax rate at the vesting year (“Proxy 3”), 
which is commonly used in U.S.-based studies (e.g., Blouin et al. 2010; Shevlin 
                                                   
28 The missing values of share-based and option-based compensation belong to the years prior to 2008. 
 40 
1990; Graham 1996), with some adjustments to adapt to Canadian tax provisions to 
capture a firm’s tendency to use a firm-specific expected marginal tax rate for tax 
planning.   
It is noteworthy that proxy 1 is the basis for developing proxy 2, and proxy 2 and proxy 
3 are used to test this study’s hypotheses on equity compensations that involve expected 
corporate tax status at the vesting year.  
5.3.1 Trichotomous measures of corporate tax status at grant year 
Prior research in tax accounting (e.g., Klassen and Mawani 2000; Core and Guay 2001; 
Blouin and Carter 2010) uses Plesko’s (2003) trichotomous measure of a firm’s tax-paying 
status at grant year as a proxy for corporate tax planning.  Using Plesko’s measure, Klassen 
and Mawani (2000) classify the tax-paying status of a firm at the grant year as low if the firm 
has a negative taxable income and non zero non-capital loss carryforwards (“TLCF”); high if 
the firm has a positive taxable income and no non-capital loss carryforwards; and moderate if 
the firm has a positive taxable income and non zero tax loss carryforwards, or a negative 
taxable income and non zero tax loss carryforwards.  I use similar methodology in this study 
to identify the expected future tax-paying status at the grant year, assuming that firms use 
grant year tax status for corporate tax planning.   
Following Blouin et al. (2010) and Mills and Graham (2008), I compute the taxable 
income at grant year as follows.  Using financial statement data available on COMPUSTAT, 
Canadian firms’ taxable income before tax and interest at grant year (TIBTI) is: 𝑇𝐼𝐵𝑇𝐼 = 𝑃𝐼 + 	𝐼𝑁𝑇	– 	𝐷𝑇𝐸 + 𝑃𝑇_𝐸𝑋_𝐷𝐼𝑆 + 𝑆𝑃𝐼 
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where PI is the pretax income at grant year; INT is the interest expense at grant year; DTE is 
deferred income at grant year; PT_EX_DIS is pretax income from extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations; and SPI is special items at grant year. 
I classify the grant year tax-paying status of a firm as high and assign the indicator 
variable HIGH_TAX_G as one if the firm has positive taxable income (TIBTI>0) and no 
non-capital loss carryforwards in the three years prior to the grant year (TLCF=0) and zero, 
otherwise.  I classify the grant year tax-paying status of a firm as low and assign the indicator 
variable LOW_TAX_G as one if the firm has negative taxable income (TIBTI<=0) and 
positive non-capital loss carryforwards (TLCF>0) in the three years prior to the grant year 
and zero, otherwise.  I classify the rest of the firm-year observations as moderate tax paying 
status at the grant year and assign MOD_TAX_G as one if the firm-year observations are 
neither low nor high and zero, otherwise. 
5.3.2 Trichotomous measures of corporate tax status during vesting period 
Expected tax-paying status during the vesting period of the equity grants is likely to 
influence a firm’s choice to grant tax-deductible RSUs, since the tax deduction is expected to 
be realized in the year when the RSU grants fully vest or the executive chooses to exercise 
his vested stock options.  Future taxable income and expected tax loss carryforwards during 
the vesting period are required to estimate the trichotomous measures of corporate tax status 
in the vesting year as previously explained. 
I developed a program to project the future taxable income during the vesting period.  
Since most RSU and stock option plans vest in three years, I first simulated the expected 
taxable income of the future three years following the grant year and used a non-parametric 
model to estimate future taxable income.  Prior research uses a random walk model (e.g., 
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Shelvin 1990) and non-parametric model (e.g. Blouin et al. 2010).  However, the random 
walk assumption does not work well in estimating future taxable income (Blouin et al. 2010) 
because the model assumes that the error terms are normally distributed.  Since taxable 
income may or may not follow the normality assumption of residuals used in the random 
walk model, I followed a non-parametric model developed by Blouin et al. (2010). 
The future taxable income of a sample firm is based on how other firms perform in the 
previous years in terms of assets growth and changes in their performance, which is 
measured as TIBTI (see Section 5.3.1) divided by average total assets, or ROA.  In Appendix 
B, I describe the procedure used to simulate the future taxable income using a non-parametric 
model which I adapted from Blouin et al. (2010).  
Next, I compute the tax loss carryforward for the year t+1 and year t+2, based on tax 
loss carryforwards of year t-2, t-1, and t, historical data available in COMPUSTAT, 
simulated future taxable income for the year t+1, t+2, and t+3, and historical taxable income 
for t-2, t-1, and t. 
Three prior years historical data are required because a loss in the year 2005, for 
example, can be offset with positive taxable income in the year 2002, provided some of the 
positive taxable income is available, i.e., no losses carryforward from years prior to the year 
2002.  If the positive taxable income in 2002 is completely offset, any remaining loss can be 
used to offset positive taxable income in 2003.  If the positive taxable income in 2003 is 
completely offset, any remaining loss can then be used to offset positive taxable income in 
2004.  If any loss remains, it may be saved as tax loss carryforwards and may be used to 
offset future positive taxable income up to 20 years (i.e., 2006-2025).  If the taxable income 
in any of those years is negative, that negative income is added to the tax loss carryforwards 
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and a first-in-first-out approach is applied to offset any current year positive income with the 
tax loss carryforwards.  Tax losses that cannot be carried back 3 years or forward 20 years 
expire and are usually removed from the “inventory” of tax loss carryforwards. 
To give an example of how tax loss carryforwards (hereafter “TLCF”) are estimated in 
a more general setting, assume TLCF(t)=0, and TIBTI(t-2)=($1000), TIBTI(t-1)=($2000) and 
TIBTI(t)=($3000).  Assume simulated TIBTI(t+1)=$1000 and TIBTI(t+2)=$1500.  Since tax 
loss carryforward at t is zero, there is no carryforward loss to t+1 year from prior years.  
Since taxable income at year t+1 is positive, there is no tax loss to carryback to prior 3 years.  
Therefore, TLCF(t+1) will be zero.  Next, consider TIBTI(t+2).  Since it is also a positive 
income, there is no tax loss to carryforward to the future years.  Hence, TLCF(t+2) will also 
be zero.  In the next scenario, assume TLCF(t)=0, and TIBTI(t-2)=($1000), TIBTI(t-
1)=($2000) and TIBTI(t)=($3000), but  TIBTI(t+1)=($1000) and TIBTI(t+2)=$500.  In this 
case, since the tax loss carryforward at t is zero, there is no carryforward loss to t+1 year 
from prior years.  Since taxable income at year t+1 is negative, this loss can be carried back 
to prior 3 years; however, all prior three years also experienced losses, so TLCF(t+1) will be 
$1000, which can be used to offset future positive taxable income.   Since TIBTI(t+2) is 
positive $500, TLCF(t+1) =$1000>0, TLCF(t+1) should be offset against positive 
TIBTI(t+2).  Since TIBTI(t+2) is less than TLCF(t+1), the unused portion of TLCF(t+1) will 
be TLCF(t+2), i.e., TLCF(t+2) equals the absolute value of TIBTI(t+2) minus TLCF(t+1).   
Figure 4 presents the algorithm developed for a general scenario when tax loss 
carryforward for year t is zero and taxable income for the year t-2, t-1, and t are negative.  
There are 8 different scenarios for the combination of taxable income, at year t-2, t-1, and t 
 44 
when tax loss carryforward at year t equals zero, and one scenario with non zero tax loss 
carryforwards at year t. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
After the computation of tax loss carryforward for years t+1 and t+2, I apply Plesko’s 
(2003) methodology to classify a firm’s tax paying statuses at year t+1, t+2 and t+3.  As 
stated in section 5.3.1, I classify the vesting year (t+1) tax-paying status of a firm as high 
(low) if the firm has positive (negative) taxable income at the vesting year t+1 (TIBTIt+1) and 
no (non-zero) non-capital loss carryforwards in the year prior to year t+1 (tlcft).  I classify the 
rest of firm-year observations as moderate tax paying status at year t+1.  A similar 
classification is made for year t+2 and t+3.  Since I simulated 50 distinct paths of projected 
vesting period taxable income, I took an average of 50 tax-paying statuses and used the 
average as the expected tax paying status. 
I classify corporate tax status at vesting year as HIGH_TAX_V (LOW_TAX_V) if the 
tax paying statuses at year t+1, t+2, and t+3 are all in high (low) expected tax statuses and 
MOD_TAX_V otherwise.   
5.3.3 Ex ante marginal tax rate  
Prior research (e.g., Graham 1996; Graham and Mills 2008) shows that simulated tax 
variable is the best proxy for the perfect foresight marginal tax rate (MTR) and is considered 
superior in testing hypotheses, such as corporate decision on executive compensation, instead 
of using more readily available data such as the existence of tax loss carryforwards at the 
grant year to identify the corporate tax status employed in prior literature (Blouin et al. 2010; 
Graham 2003; Shevlin 1990; Graham and Mills 2008).  Although the marginal tax rates are 
frequently used in U.S. based research studies, very few studies use the simulated corporate 
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marginal tax rates associated with Canadian firms due to the complex nature of estimating 
tax-code-consistent marginal tax rates that account for the carryback and carry forward tax 
treatment of net operating losses (tax losses carryforward).  In this study, I develop a 
simulated marginal tax rate for each Canadian firm-year and use it as a proxy for corporate 
tax planning.  I first simulate the ex ante taxable income by following Blouin et al.’s (2010) 
model of predicting 50 different paths of future taxable income as explained in section 5.3.2 
(and Appendix B) and compute the marginal tax rates during the vesting period by 
implementing Shevlin’s (1990) algorithm.  
The marginal tax rate of a corporation is defined as the present value of an increase in 
current and future tax liability on an extra dollar of current taxable income (Shevlin 1990; 
Graham 1996; Blouin et al. 2010).  As explained in Section 5.3.2, due to the current 
Canadian tax rules allowing losses to carryback three years and carryforward 20 years to 
offset prior and future positive taxable income, the potential tax expense on an additional 
dollar of income earned today depends on current income, three prior years of income, and 
20 years of future income.  Since the majority of Canadian firms’ RSU grants vest in three 
years as indicated in the annual management information circulars, I choose to simulate the 
marginal tax rates for three years following the grant year.  Therefore, the simulation 
procedure involves estimating 23 years of future taxable income.   
In sum, the rule that allows firms to carryforward tax losses to offset with future 
positive income up to 20 years requires simulating 20 years of future taxable income.  The 
rule that allows three year carryback losses to offset year 20 positive taxable income affects 
the tax liability of Year 20.  For example, a non-zero probability of negative taxable income 
in Year 21, 22 and 23 affects the tax liability of Year 20 and thus, computing marginal tax 
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rate for year t requires simulating future taxable income for additional three years beyond 
Year t+20.  Figure 5(a) summarizes why this study requires a stream of 23 years of taxable 
income to compute the marginal tax rate at grant year (computing an incremental tax liability 
for an additional income earned in year t).   
[Figure 5 about here] 
If a researcher requires forecasting the marginal tax rate for the vesting year, let’s say 
marginal tax rate at Year t+3, it involves estimating a stream of 26 years of future taxable 
income, i.e., estimating the taxable income of Year t+1 to t+26.  Year t+4 to t+23 are 
required to allow for tax losses in t+3 to carryforward 20 years, and Year t+24 to Year t+26 
are required to allow for the effect of the three-year loss carryback rule on the tax liability of 
Year t+23.  As a result, computing the marginal tax rate for the vesting year requires 
simulation of 26 years of future taxable income. Figure 5(b) summarizes the future taxable 
income streams required to compute the marginal tax rate at the vesting year (computing an 
incremental tax liability for an additional income earned in year t+3).   
In addition to estimating a stream of future taxable income, as suggested in Shelvin 
(1990), expected statutory tax rates and expected interest rates for the next 26 years are 
required.  I extrapolate the current statutory tax rate to the next 26 years and use Bank of 
Canada’s prime rate as the discount rate to compute the present value of future taxable 
income.29  Since future interest rates are also required, I similarly extrapolate the current 
interest rate to the following 26 years.  The marginal tax rate computation also requires the 
estimation of future tax loss carryforwards.  I compute the future tax loss carryforwards using 
the procedure detailed in Section 5.3.2. 
                                                   
29 This extrapolation may be an oversimplification; however, it is the most reasonable assumption given the lack 
of information I have regarding future tax rates and interest rates.  Therefore, the simulated corporate taxable 
income and corporate marginal tax rates may be perceived as noisy measures. 
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I next apply Shevlin’s (1990) method of computing future corporate marginal tax rates.  
In the following section, I present an algorithm of how I estimate future corporate marginal 
tax rates.  The algorithm to compute corporate marginal tax rates is based on four different 
scenarios as described in Shevlin (1990).  The main algorithm is presented in Figure 6(a).  
Figure 6(b) to 6(e) present how the corporate marginal tax rate is determined for each of four 
scenarios. 
[Figure 6 about here.] 
Scenario 1 (See Figure 6(b).):  When the current taxable income is negative with zero 
tax loss carryforward from previous years, the negative taxable income can be carried back to 
the prior three years, provided some of prior three years’ positive taxable income is still 
available to offset with the loss.  Therefore, the corporate marginal tax rate of the current 
year depends on whether the taxable incomes of the previous three years are positive and 
sufficient to offset the current loss.  If both conditions are met, the corporate marginal tax 
rate is the same as the current statutory tax rate.  If both conditions are not met, the loss can 
carryforward for up to 20 years.  This tax loss carryforward remainder calls for Scenario 2, 
with the tax loss carryforward being non-zero at the end of year t.  The corporate marginal 
tax rate then depends on the amount of the tax loss carryforward, the amount of future 
taxable income stream, and the existence of negative future taxable income, which is 
determined by testing when future taxable income is completely offset.  This test is covered 
in Scenario 2. 
Scenario 2 (See Figure 6(c).):  When the current taxable income is negative with a non-
zero tax loss carryforward from previous years, the negative taxable income cannot carryback 
to the prior three years; however, the 20 year carryforward rule allows this tax loss to offset 
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future taxable income.  If all future 23 years are expected to have positive taxable income, 
the corporate marginal tax rate is determined for period in which the entire tax loss is offset 
against the taxable income.  Thus, the corporate marginal tax rate is computed as the 
expected statutory tax rate of the year of complete offset, discounted using the expected 
interest rate of that year.  If such a condition is not met, that is, there is a non-zero probability 
of negative taxable income, the three-year loss carryback rule affects the tax liability of the 
year that a firm is expected to offset its tax loss remainder.  Such condition is tested in 
Scenario 3. 
Scenario 3 (See Figure 6(d).): When the current taxable income is positive with a zero 
tax loss carryforward from previous years, the corporate marginal tax rate of current taxable 
income depends on whether the taxable income of the future 3 years have a non-zero 
probability of expecting negative taxable income.  If the simulation program does not 
generate negative income, the corporate marginal tax rate is similar to the statutory tax rate.  
Otherwise, the corporate marginal tax rate is the statutory tax rate at year t minus the 
statutory tax rate at year n, discounted by the interest rate at Year n: n represents the year 
when the positive taxable income at year t is completely offset by expected losses. 
Scenario 4 (See Figure 6(e).): When the current taxable income is positive with a non-
zero tax loss carryforward from previous years, the tax loss carryforward is first offset 
against the positive income.  If there is no remaining tax loss, this scenario meets the 
condition to apply Scenario 3, which is a positive taxable income with a zero tax loss 
carryforward.  Otherwise, tax loss carryforward exceeds the current year positive taxable 
income.  Thus, the carryforward loss fully offsets the current year positive taxable income 
and leaves a non-zero tax loss carryforward for future years, which is in fact Scenario 2. 
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By following the procedures detailed above, I simulate the corporate marginal tax rate 
at grant year, at one year after the grant year, and for each year up to and including three 
years following the grant year.  The simulated corporate marginal tax rates are presented 
together with the summary statistics in Chapter 6.  
5.4 Measurement of managerial power 
Prior studies such as Abernethy et al. (2015), Gerakos (2010), and van Essen et al. 
(2012) measure managerial power as a composite measure of four board-related proxies, two 
of which capture heightened illegitimate executive power and two that capture constrained 
executive power.  The justifications for using these variables are as follows. 30 
Board size. Managerial power increases with the size of the board, which is measured 
by the natural logarithmic function of the number of directors.  Bigger boards are slower in 
decision-making and reluctant to criticize managerial performance and hence, function less 
effectively (Yermack 1996).  Accordingly, executives of firms with bigger boards have more 
control over the board. 
Proportion of insiders as board members. The inside directors have more power over 
the careers of other managers.  Therefore, managerial power rises with an increasing 
                                                   
30 Prior research (e.g., van Essen et al. 2015) also uses Number of board committees the executive serves on 
(MEMBER) and Executive tenure (TENURE).  By using these components, managerial power is in effect a 
measure of the extent of power executives has on the board in decision-making.  Some proxies, specifically 
MEMBER and TENURE used in this measure have some limitations.  (1) In this study, specifically for 
Canadian executives, the data are not readily available and the hand-collection of data such as the number of 
boards and executive tenure can be quite tasking.  Additionally, not all Canadian executives, except board 
members, have such data made available in LinkedIn or Bloomberg or annual statements or proxy statements. 
The missing executive-specific information to construct the managerial power of each executive will further 
reduce my sample size and may potentially affect the power of the tests. (2) The measure MEMBER may not 
capture the level of power an executive exerts on the board.  The number of boards an executive serves on may 
affect how the board perceives the executive only if all or majority of board members generally serve on fewer 
boards than the executive.  Without accounting for the board member’s demand in the labour market, this 
MEMBER variable may not capture the extent of an executive’s power on the board.  Additionally, many top 
five executives do not serve on any board, and therefore, using this proxy may provide little to no variation in 
measuring the managerial power distance among top five executives. 
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proportion of insiders on the board (Byrd and Hickman 1992). 
Proportion of firm ownership of the largest shareholders.  The largest owners have the 
power to nominate directors, and are active in the monitoring of managerial activities, 
executive compensation plans, and other board decisions (Smith 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 
1997).  Therefore, ownership concentration, measured as the total percentage of the 
outstanding shares owned by shareholders who own at least 5% of the outstanding shares, 
constrains managerial power. 
Percentage of institutional ownership.  Institutional owners have expertise and are 
more active monitors of firm’s compensation practices (Hartzell and Starks 2003).  
Therefore, institutional ownership, measured as the percentage of the total ownership of 
institutional investors, constrains managerial power. 
To overcome data limitation and reduce the burden of manual data collection, I look 
into the executive pay slice (EPS) variable constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2011) as one of the 
managerial power proxies.  Bebchuk et al. (2011) define executive pay slice 31 as the 
proportion of the total compensation paid to the top five executives that goes to an executive.  
The authors find that the EPS incrementally explains the characteristics of firm’s top 
executives in addition to the executive being a member of the board and the executive power 
distance from other top executives. They therefore argue that the EPS represents the relative 
power held by the executive, the power to extract rent, and the management hierarchy. The 
total compensation used in computing the EPS includes salary, bonus, other annual pay, the 
total value of restricted stock grants, the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants, long-
term incentives payout, if any, and all other total compensation.  This construct of using total 
                                                   
31 I am grateful to the faculty members at the University of Waterloo for suggesting this variable during my 
dissertation proposal. 
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compensation allows the regression model to control for firm characteristics that affect the 
average level of executive compensation within the firm.  
I hand-collected firm-specific BOARD SIZE and INSIDERS annual data from 
management information circulars for the sample period.  Ferreira and Matos (2008) have 
made OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION and INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP data available 
via FactSet database. I employ principal component analysis (PCA) and create a factor score 
that weighs each of the observed items at the firm level.  The value of the composite measure 
(POWER) increases with the level of managerial power (Abernethy et al. 2015).  The mean, 
median, standard deviation, and interquartile measures of the POWER variable are similar to 
that of Abernethy et al. (2015).  I complement the POWER variable with the Executive Pay 
Slice (EPS) in the regression model in the following section to represent the power held by 
each executive within the firm.   
5.5 Regression model 
My research design is based on the work of Carter et al. (2007) who investigate the 
effect of financial reporting concerns on the use of stock options and restricted stocks during 
the period 1995-2001 as described previously, and on the work of Klassen and Mawani 
(2000) who investigate the effect of trade-off between financial and tax reporting incentives 
on the use of cash and stock options during the period 1993-1995 as described in previous 
sections. 
Some of the challenges of analyzing the effect of tax reporting incentives on the design 
of executive equity compensation are estimating future corporate taxable income, computing 
corporate marginal tax rate and controlling for many non-tax factors that could be important.  
Carter et al.’s (2007) main research question involves investigating the effect of financial 
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reporting incentives and the effect of the accounting rule on the reporting of stock option 
expense, which may be a likely cause for firms shifting from stock option compensation to 
restricted shares compensation. Although they do not consider tax issues, their regression 
model includes the non-tax variables that are relevant to my research question. 
Incorporating the non-tax variables used in Carter et al. (2007), I estimate the following 
model to test the effect of corporate tax planning and managerial power on the executive 
equity design. 
𝐑𝐒𝐔_𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 = 	𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝐌𝐓𝐑𝐢,𝐣,𝐭X𝟑 + 𝛃𝟐𝐏𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫𝐢,𝐣,𝐭^𝟏 	+ 𝛃𝟑𝐌𝐓𝐑𝐢,𝐣,𝐭X𝟑 ∗ 𝐏𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫𝐢,𝐣,𝐭^𝟏 +` 𝛃𝐢	𝐗𝐧𝐢c𝟒+ 𝛆𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 
Equation (1) 
where 𝑖 is the executive, 𝑗 is the firm, and 𝑡 is the grant year.  RSU_ratiom,n,o denotes executive 
equity compensation mix for the executive 𝑖 of firm 𝑗,	at the grant year 𝑡.  MTRn,oXq is 
expected corporate tax incentives at the vesting year, which is approximated at three years 
following the grant year 𝑡.  In this study, I use two different proxies to capture corporate tax 
planning at vesting year: (1) dichotomous measures of expected corporate tax-paying status 
at the vesting year, and (2) expected corporate marginal tax rate, which is the present value of 
the change in taxes payable in the present and future for a dollar increase in taxable income at 
the vesting year.  Powerm,n,o^tdenotes managerial power, which constitutes two measures, a 
factor created from principal component analysis of four board-related variables as 
previously discussed in Section 5.4, which are measured at the year prior to the grant year at 
firm j, and Executive Pay Slice (EPS), which is the proportion of the total compensation paid 
to the top five executives that goes to the executive i at grant year t.  Control variables (X) 
include cash constraint (CASH_CONSTR) for firm 𝑗 at the grant year 𝑡; dividend payout 
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(DIV_PAYOUT) for firm j; earnings volatility (𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁_𝑉𝑂𝐿) measured at year t-1; Stock 
volatility (𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾_𝑉𝑂𝐿) measured at the year following the grant year, 𝑡 + 1; bankruptcy 
risk (Z-SCORE) measured for firm 𝑗 at the grant year t; firm size (LN_ASSET) measured for 
firm 𝑗 at the end of grant year 𝑡; growth opportunities (BOOK_MKT) measured for firm j at 
the end of grant year 𝑡; firm performance (𝑅𝐸𝑇) measured at grant year 𝑡 for firm 𝑗, and 
industry controls (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌) using COMPUSTAT categories.  I describe the rationale for 
including these control variables and their measurements in next section (Section 5.6).  
Variable descriptions are also summarized in Appendix D. 
H1 predicts the proportion of tax-deductible RSU grants in the total equity 
compensation (the RSU ratio) increases with the expected corporate marginal tax rate among 
Canadian firms.  If so, there should be a positive coefficient on the expected corporate 
marginal tax rate or corporate tax status (MTR) at the vesting year (βt) in Equation (1).  H2 
predicts that the proportion of tax-deductible RSU grants in the total equity compensation 
(the RSU ratio) decreases with managerial power among Canadian firms.  If so, there should 
be a negative coefficient on the managerial power proxy POWER in Equation (1) β.  Since 
the managerial power proxy has two components POWER and EPS, I use two notations,	βt 
and β, to represent  β.   H2 implies a negative coefficient on POWER	(βt) and EPS	(β).  
H3 predicts that managerial power should mitigate the association between corporate tax 
planning and the RSU ratio among Canadian executives.  Thus, the coefficient on the 
interaction term between corporate tax planning and managerial power (𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅) 
(βqt) and (𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝑆) (βq) is predicted to be negative.  As a result of two components of the 𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅 proxy, I use βqt and  βq to represent the interaction term βq. 
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5.6 Control variables 
The rationale underlying the effect of control variables on the RSU ratio, how these 
control variables are measured, and their predicted signs are as follows.  
Firms that are expected to face cash flow constraints at vesting (CASH_CONSTR).  
Firms require a significant amount of cash if they pledge to satisfy RSUs and PSUs with cash 
payout or non-treasury share payout (i.e., tax deductible RSU grants) whereas stock options 
do not require cash outflow and are sometimes used by firms that need to conserve cash (Lee 
2010).  Accordingly, firms expecting to experience a cash shortage in the future may prefer 
to use stock options. I measure cash flow constraints as the average realized cash flow 
constraints of a three-year period ending with the grant year (𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 − 1, and 𝑡).32    
Following Core and Guay (1999), cash flow constraint is constructed as, [(Common and 
preferred dividends + net cash flow from investing activities – cash flow provided by 
operating activities)/total assets] and can range from negative to positive numbers.   By 
construct, the larger numbers represent higher cash flow constraints and vice versa.  I expect 
a negative relation between cash flow constraint and the RSU ratio.   
Dividend payout (DIV_PAYOUT).  Stock option holders are not entitled to the 
dividend payout whilst most RSU holders receive dividends (Carter et al. 2007).  Thus, if 
firms are currently paying high dividends, the executives will prefer dividend-paying shares 
rather than stock options.  I expect a positive relation between dividend payout and the RSU 
ratio.  Following Carter et al. (2007), the average dividend payout is computed as the average 
                                                   
32 One may argue that it is more appropriate to use cash flow constraints at the vesting years (𝑡 + 1,𝑡 + 2, and 𝑡 + 3).  However, data requirement to compute future cash flow constraints will severely limit the number of 
observations available for hypotheses testing.  Since firms may set aside some amount of current cash to 
repurchase shares in the market before the RSUs vest, using current cash flow constraint as a proxy for expected 
cash flow constraints at the vesting year is reasonable.   
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of dividends per share over a three-year period ending with the year prior to the grant year 
(𝑡 − 3, 𝑡 − 2, and 𝑡 − 1)). 
Firms’ earnings volatility.  Carter et al. (2007) argue that firms with higher earnings 
volatility may grant restricted shares because share-based grants provide the recipient with 
consistently positive compensation.  They also note that the probability of stock options 
being in the money may be higher for firms with higher earnings volatility and did not 
formalize a directional prediction.  Earnings volatility is measured as the variance of return 
on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) over a ten-year period prior to the grant year 𝑡.   
Stock volatility. Prior research finds that firms with higher stock volatility use a greater 
proportion of stock options because the value of stock options increases with volatility (e.g., 
Boyle et al. 2011) or employees’ preference for a large outcome with small probability of 
achieving that outcome33 (e.g., Spalt 2013). Volatility is measured as the standard deviation 
of unadjusted daily returns over the 12 months following the grant year 𝑡.  I expect a negative 
relation between stock volatility and the RSU ratio. 
Bankruptcy risk. Kadan and Swinkels (2008) find that firms facing bankruptcy risk are 
highly likely to use a higher proportion of share-based grants.  Thus, I predict a positive 
association between bankruptcy risk, measured by Altman’s Z-score (see Altman (1968)), 
and the RSU ratio.  See Appendix D for how the Altman’s Z-score is computed.  
Firm-specific factors that affect the level of equity compensation: firm size, 
investment opportunities, and performance.  Consistent with the control variables used in 
the study by Carter et al. (2007), I consider firm size, investment opportunities and stock 
                                                   
33 The literature terms such preference as employees’ preference for a lottery ticket, implying that option gains 
are similar to lottery winnings. 
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performance that affect the level of equity compensation (cash to equity ratio) directly and 
may affect the RSU ratio indirectly.   
Firm size and investment opportunities.  Prior literature (e.g., Smith and Watts 1992) 
contends that large firms, and firms with high investment opportunities are more difficult to 
monitor; therefore, such firms are more likely to use equity compensation because equity 
compensation is known to align agent and principal interests.  Since prior research does not 
clarify whether monitoring is more effective using either restricted shares or stock options, I 
am unable to predict the direction of the RSU ratio with firm size and investment 
opportunities.  I can only conjecture that both restricted shares and stock options have a 
positive relation with firm size and investment opportunities, to the extent that both are 
equally efficient in monitoring.  Following Carter et al. (2007), firm size is measured as the 
natural log of total assets and investment opportunities as the book-to-market ratio at the end 
of the grant year. By construct, the RSU ratio has a positive relation with the natural log of 
total assets and a negative relation with book-to-market ratio.   
Stock performance.  Murphy (1985) finds that the level of equity compensation is 
positively correlated with stock performance.  Prior studies measure stock performance as 
cumulative monthly stock return in the grant year t (Carter et al. 2007).  Assuming the level 
of both restricted shares and stock options grants are positively associated with stock 
performance, I predict that the RSU ratio is positively associated with the stock performance.   
Industry effect.  Further, I include industry indicator variables.  The industry indicator 
variables capture cross sectional differences in labour market conditions in different 
industries and how these differences affect compensation practices across industries (Oyer 
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and Schaefer 2005; Carter et al. 2007). To correct serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, I 
include yearly indicators in my regression model (Carter et al. 2007).   
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter reviews the construction of my dependent variable, executive equity 
compensation structure and the two independent variables: corporate tax planning incentives 
and managerial power proxies.  Given that a major contribution of this thesis is the 
introduction of the ex ante corporate taxable income simulation and marginal corporate tax 
rate for Canadian firms and the construction of Canadian executive compensation data, this 
section devotes considerable attention to describing how the underlying data is constructed.  
Equation (1) in this chapter forms the basis of my tests for Hypothesis 1 through 3, and I 
provide the description and measurement of control variables and the rationale behind these 
control variables.  The results are reported in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 6 
Sample Selection and Empirical Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I first describe my sample selection process.  Using the sample data, I 
test my three hypotheses and thus examine the relation between executive equity 
compensation structure and corporate tax planning and managerial power.  I empirically 
examine Equation (1) from section 5.5 using executive-level samples of data, over the time 
period 2005-2015.  This chapter includes seven sections, including this introduction and 
conclusion. 
Section 6.2 of this chapter describes how I choose my sample and the rationale for the 
sample period.  I hand-collected executive compensation data of top five executives for TSX 
200 firms during the period 2005-2015.  This sample period choice helps with avoiding 
confounding factors, such as financial reporting incentives of stock option compensation, 
examined in prior accounting studies and the choice to collect the compensation data of 
multiple executives within a firm across multiple years increases my sample observations.  
These two choices balance the need for a realistic sample size for test power with the 
demands of hand data collection. 
Section 6.3 reports the descriptive statistics pertinent to my hypotheses test.  This 
section also includes a review of a Pearson correlation table for my main explanatory 
variables of interest and control variables.   
Section 6.4 reports the results of the pooled regression tests using an OLS model.  
Section 6.5 reports a number of different estimations in an effort to validate the results 
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documented in the previous section, including clustering standard errors at the firm level and 
employing firm fixed effects.  Section 6.6 includes additional analyses using a different tax 
planning proxy, and robustness checks across subsamples.  Section 6.7 and 6.8 devote to 
assessing the effects of firm-specific risk and shareholder activism on the previous findings.  
Section 6.9 discusses the limitations of the ex ante corporate marginal tax rate measure and 
Section 6.10 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Sample selection 
I focus on a sample of Canadian public nonfinancial companies traded on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (200 TSX Canadian firms) during the fiscal years 2005−2015.   I restrict the 
sample to firms whose management information circulars, hence annual executive 
compensation data, are available in the SEDAR34 filing system (www.sedar.com) and annual 
financial statement information is available in COMPUSTAT.  Consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Abernethy et al. 2015), I exclude financial firms in my sample because these 
firms are subject to different regulatory standards and leverage levels.  These restrictions 
reduce the sample to 143 non-financial firms.  To avoid potential confounds related to 
financial reporting incentives of granting stock options as examined in prior studies, the 
sample period in this study begins after the first year of mandatory expensing of stock 
options.  My choice of sample firms and sample period is also subject to the cost 
consideration of the hand-collection of executive compensation and managerial power data.   
I hand-collected compensation-related data of top executives of these 143 firms.  The 
‘Summary Compensation Table’ of the annual Management Information Circular provides 
the names of the executives, their current position, and the cash and equity compensation 
                                                   
34 SEDAR stands for the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval. 
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components of a firm’s five most highly compensated officers.35 I read footnotes and equity-
based plan information to identify the type and payout structure of share-based and option-
based grants.  From the summary table of executive compensation of each grant year, I hand-
collected the grant date fair value of RSU grants and the Black-Scholes value of employee 
stock options granted to each executive. I read the stock-based compensation plan section of 
the management information circulars (and annual reports) to identify whether the RSU 
grants are satisfied by cash, repurchased shares, newly issued shares, or treasury shares.  If 
the RSU grants are to be satisfied or satisfiable by cash or repurchased shares, I classify the 
grants as tax-deductible RSUs.  I also read the stock option plan section of the management 
information circulars to confirm that the employee stock options are granted at-the-money or 
out-of-the-money, the majority of which are at-the-money stock options, and hence are tax-
favoured at the employee level.  I classify SARs and TSARs separately and these 
observations are not included in my analysis.   
My initial sample has 7,509 executive-years (143 unique non-financial Canadian firms 
and 1,705 unique executives).  In hypothesis testing, the number of observations is 
significantly less because not all executive-year observations have the required data.  I 
remove 514 executive compensation data observations of some firm-years because some 
firms do not disclose all top five executive compensation data in some years.36  I remove 
additional 1,395 observations as a result of missing control variables in some years.  As 
previously explained, some firms do not grant equity compensation in some years to some 
top executives or the firms may grant only non-tax-deductible RSUs or restricted shares as 
                                                   
35 Firms are required to provide such information in 2008.  Information provided prior to 2008 was not as 
complete as that post-2007.  
36 Top five executive compensation data are required to compute executive pay slice (EPS), a proxy for each 
executive’s power within a firm. 
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equity incentives. There are 345 observations with non-tax-deductible RSUs or restricted 
shares grants and 1,030 observations with zero equity compensation.  Since RSU ratio is 
defined as the proportion of tax-deductible RSU grants to the sum of tax-deductible RSU 
grants and the employee tax-favoured options, these observations are not included in testing 
the hypotheses.  A total of 45 observations are also removed because there is not enough data 
to compute the corporate marginal tax rate and managerial power variables for certain years.  
My full sample has 3,983 executive-years (127 unique nonfinancial Canadian firms) that are 
used in hypotheses testing.     
As explained in Chapter 2, family member executives may not be eligible for a 50% 
reduction allowed for employee stock option grants because these transactions are not 
considered as at arms’ length.  Additionally, the power dynamic between family member 
executives and the board may be unusual as these executives may hold a higher degree of 
social and economic power over non-family board members (García-Ramos and García-
Olalla 2011).  Therefore, it is necessary to test the hypotheses using non-family run firm 
subsample.  Based on the data made available to the public through the Clarkson Centre for 
Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness (CCBE), I identify Canadian family owned firms 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.  According to the June 2013 CCBE report,37 16 firms 
in my sample are identified as family firms by CCBE.38  Thus, 509 observations of family 
firms are eliminated from the full sample.  The testing non-family firm subsample consists of 
3,474 executive-years.  After removing 197 executive-year observations, which are identified 
                                                   
37 There are 23 individual family-controlled companies.   
38 The 2013 CCBE Report defines a family firm as follows. “We deemed an issuer to be family controlled if at 
least 30% voting control was held by a family member or group that has either: a) experienced one or more 
events of generational turnover or; b) family member(s) are in a clear position to succeed to the next family 
generation” (Spizzirri and Fullbrook 2013, p.1) 
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as influential observations39, a total of 3,983 observations in full sample and 3,474 
observations in non-family run firms sample are used in hypotheses testing.  Panel A of 
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of observations across the sample period.  
Although the initial executive-years are evenly distributed across the sample period, the 
observations used in hypotheses testing are not.  Specifically, there are no observations from 
fiscal year 2005 because many firms do not report top five executive compensation data in 
that year and compensation data for the top five executives are required to compute 
Executive Pay Slice (EPS), the variable to measure the power of each executive within a 
firm.    
Panel C of Table 1 presents the industry composition of the sample firms.  The mining 
industry and the energy sector (i.e., petroleum and natural gas extraction) constitute a large 
percentage of the sample firms. These results are not surprising as many big companies in 
Canada are in these industries; however, this concentration in a few industries may limit the 
generalizability of my findings.   
6.3 Descriptive statistics and Correlations 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the dependent variable, the RSU ratio as well as 
the Cash Ratio (Cash compensation divided by total compensation) and components of 
executive compensation that are used to compute the RSU ratio.  Panel A presents summary 
statistics for the RSU ratio and executive compensation components that are used to compute 
                                                   
39 An outlier, with a large residual, may or may not affect the fitted equation.  An influential observation, with a 
small residual, can significantly change the estimates of the fitted equation (Draper and John 1981).  Therefore, 
in this study, I remove influential observations using Cook’s D method.   
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the RSU ratio for the 5,600 executive-years in the initial sample. Panel B shows the same 
statistics for the 3,983 executive-years in the full sample for hypotheses testing and Panel C 
exhibits the same statistics for the 3,474 executive-years in the non-family firm only 
subsample.  Although the majority of executives in the initial sample receive a portion of 
their compensation in equity grants, about 20 percent of executives in the sample do not 
receive equity compensation in the form of corporate tax-deductible RSUs or employee tax-
favoured stock options. 
[Table 2 about here.] 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for independent variables in Equation (1).  Panel A 
presents summary statistics for all the continuous variables for the 3,983 executive-years in 
the full sample for hypotheses testing whereas Panel B exhibits the same statistics for the 
3,474 executive-years for the non-family firm subsample.  As reported in Table 3, the mean 
(median) of the expected corporate marginal tax rates of the firms in the full sample is similar 
to that of the non-family firm subsample at -0.19 (-0.19).  The mean (median) of managerial 
power measures of the firms in the full sample is somewhat bigger at -0.09 (0.02) than for the 
firms in the non-family firm subsample at -0.21 (-0.12).  This suggests a slight negative shift 
of the distribution and is consistent with the speculation that family firms may have different 
power dynamics between the board members and family-member executives.40 
[Table 3 about here.] 
Table 4 presents the bivariate correlations among test variables.  The correlation table 
indicates that firms with higher corporate marginal tax rates tend to use tax-deductible RSUs 
to a lesser extent, and managerial power decreases with increased use of tax-deductible 
                                                   
40 I run a t-test to analyze the difference in managerial power measures between family and non-family firms.  
Un-tabulated results show that the difference in the means of managerial power between these two groups are 
statistically significant from zero at one percent level, as speculated. 
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RSUs.  Most of the correlations among control variables are small (less than 0.30 and 
variance inflation factor (VIF) <10), thus, multicollinearity is not an issue (see Marquaridt 
(1970)).41 
[Table 4 about here.] 
To provide some insight into the relation between the RSU ratio and the corporate tax 
statuses proposed in Section 5.3.2, I present the RSU ratio across corporate tax statuses for 
the full sample as well as non-family firm subsample in Table 5.  The mean value of the RSU 
ratio is 0.458 (0.422) for firms expecting a high (low) tax status in the full sample.  The mean 
value of the RSU ratio is 0.467 (0.436) for firms expecting a high (low) tax status in the non-
family firm subsample. 
[Table 5 about here.] 
6.4 Main Results from pooled regression tests 
I first estimate the mean coefficients and t-statistics from standard errors of pooled 
OLS42 regression Equation (1) using the entire sample of 3,983 executive-year observations 
between 2006 and 2015.  The results are presented in Column (1) of Table 6.  I remove the 
influence of outliers by using Cook’s (1977) distance (Cook’s D) method.  I identify an 
observation as an outlier if the value of its Cook’s D is above 4/(n-k-1), where n = number of 
                                                   
41 Literature in Econometrics recommends various acceptable levels of VIF.  VIF value of 10 is generally 
acceptable (Marquaridt 1970). 
42 My dataset includes multiple year observations, and multiple executive compensation data for a give firm-
year.  Therefore, it is expected that the RSU ratio within each firm may not be independent.  This type of dataset 
violates the OLS assumption of error terms being independent.  As a result, the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors may be biased.  To overcome this caveat, I use a robust regression to re-estimate Equation (1).  
Robust regression accounts for the imperfections mentioned in the dataset and makes adjustments in the 
estimates and standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimators.  The results, untabulated, do not 
change the inferences. 
Other imperfections of my dataset: it is highly imbalanced because some smaller firms made fewer executive 
compensation data available during the sample period; the dependent variable RSU ratio is a fraction and hence, 
the distribution of RSU ratio may be highly skewed.  It is suggested that a regression with bootstrap standard 
errors helps reduce a potential non-normality due to skewed distribution of the dependent variable and 
heteroskedasticity.  The bootstrap standard errors are estimated based on subsamples drawing from the sample 
dataset with replacement (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993).  The results are similar to that using OLS method. 
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observations and k = number of independent variables, as suggested by Belsley et al. (1980).   
One of the key variables in column (1) is HIGH_TAX_V, which equals one if firms are 
expecting high corporate tax status at vesting year, and zero otherwise.   The estimated 
coefficient on HIGH_TAX_V is of the predicted sign and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level (𝛽t = +0.055, 𝑡 = +2.71) using a one-tailed test.  This suggests that, on 
average, firms expecting a high corporate tax rate at the vesting year increase the proportion 
of equity grants via tax-deductible RSUs by about 6 percent relative to firms expecting a low 
corporate tax rate at the vesting year.  This provides evidence that firms expecting a high tax 
rate at the vesting year use tax-deductible RSUs to a greater extent in equity compensation 
mix.   
[Table 6 about here] 
The second key variable in column (1) is POWER (managerial power).  The estimated 
coefficient on POWER is also significant in the predicted direction at the 1 percent level 
(𝛽t = −0.056, 𝑡 = −8.01).  The estimated coefficient on POWER indicates that, on average, 
firms decrease the proportion of the equity grants via tax-deductible RSUs by about 6 percent 
for a one standard deviation change in POWER.  The estimated coefficient on EPS is 
positive, but not statistically different from zero (𝛽 = +0.048, 𝑡 = +0.89).  Thus, managers 
(or firms with weak boards of directors) seem to influence their own compensation via the 
equity compensation mix, and managers may prefer a greater portion of employee tax-
favoured stock options in their equity compensation mix. 
The estimated coefficient on the interaction term HIGH_TAX_V*POWER is 
significant and positive (𝛽qt = +0.020, 𝑡 = +1.84), which is opposite to the predicted in H3.  
In contrast, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term HIGH_TAX_V*EPS is negative, 
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but not statistically different from zero (𝛽q = −0.067, 𝑡 = −0.78).  Thus, the results fail to 
support the prediction of H3.  One possible explanation for this finding is as follows.  For 
firms expecting a higher tax status, taxes play a more influential role and managers are likely 
to experience a high pressure from shareholders to reduce the firm’s effective tax rate.  If so, 
managers may accept reduced use of employee tax-favoured stock options in their 
compensation package when firms are facing a high tax status.   
To alleviate concerns that family-member executives and the board members may have 
a different power dynamic in family firms, I reestimate the Equation (1) by eliminating 
family firms from the full sample. The results are presented in column (2) of Table 6.   
Using the subsample of non-family firms, estimates of the coefficients of variables of 
interest are similar to that of the full sample.  Specifically, the estimated coefficient on 
HIGH_TAX_V is of the predicted sign and statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
(𝛽t = +0.054, 𝑡 = +2.38), the estimate of the coefficient on POWER is negative, consistent 
with the predicted direction (𝛽t = −0.045, 𝑡 = −6.22), and the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term HIGH_TAX_V*POWER is positive and statistically significant at 5 percent 
level (𝛽qt = +0.021, 𝑡 = +1.78).  The estimate of the coefficient on EPS is positive, but not 
significantly different from zero (𝛽 = +0.053, 𝑡 = +0.91), and the estimated coefficient on 
the interaction term HIGH_TAX_V*EPS is negative and also not statistically different from 
zero (𝛽q = −0.058, 𝑡 = −0.61).  Taken together, the results can be interpreted as follows.  
Firms use tax-deductible RSUs to a greater extent in equity mix when they expect a higher 
tax rate.  When the tax paying status is low, a one standard deviation change in the 
managerial power decreases the RSU ratio by 0.05; however, when the tax playing status is 
high, the same increase in managerial power increases the RSU ratio by 0.02.  The individual 
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executive does not seem to have a lot of influence on his/her equity compensation mix.  This 
finding suggests that managers may forego employee tax-favoured stock options when firms 
are expecting a high tax rate.43 
6.5 Specification checks 
Fixed effects model 
The effect of corporate tax planning and managerial power on equity compensation 
structure is also estimated in a fixed effects model.  The fixed effects model controls for the 
effects of firm-specific correlated omitted variables, such as shareholders’ preference for 
upward potential but not downside risk or shareholders’ preference to use the same 
compensation structure as their peer or other firm-specific correlated omitted variables that 
exist in the cross-sectional panel data.  This model will also alleviate concerns about my 
pooled estimation results being potentially driven by a lack of independence of observations 
within firms (WWAC, n.d). 
[Table 7 about here.] 
With this model, the results are more consistent with the directional predictions.  The 
estimated coefficients on expected corporate marginal tax rate (HIGH_TAX_V) and 
managerial power (POWER) are consistent with predictions and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level using the full sample (See column (1) of Table 7.  (𝛽t = 	+0.043, 𝑡 = +2.65 
and 𝛽t = 	−0.036, 𝑡 = −5.32)). The estimated coefficient on the interaction term 
(HIGH_TAX_V*POWER) is negative as predicted but fails to reach statistical significance 
(𝛽qt = 	−0.01, 𝑡 = −1.04).  The estimated coefficient on EPS is positive and weakly 
significant at 10 percent level (𝛽 = 	+0.049, 𝑡 = +1.30) and the estimated coefficient on 
                                                   
43 I run F-tests to validate the predictive ability of the unrestricted regression model for both full and family 
firms sample.  The overall F statistic is significant at the one percent level.  Therefore, the null hypothesis that 
all the variables of interest simultaneously have no effect on the RSU ratio can be rejected. 
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the interaction term (HIGH_TAX_V*EPS) is negative as predicted but is not statistically 
different from zero (𝛽q = 	−0.049, 𝑡 = −0.83). 
In column (2) of Table 7, the results of a fixed effects model using non-family run firm 
subsample are presented.  The directions of the estimated coefficients are generally consistent 
with the predictions and statistically significant at a 5 percent level, except that of EPS, 
whose coefficient is opposite of the prediction but lacks statistical significance.  The 
coefficients on HIGH_TAX_V and HIGH_TAX_V*EPS also are not statistically different 
from zero.  The results consistently support H2 and H3 predictions.  The individual executive 
power does not seem to have a significant effect on his/her equity compensation mix based 
on the estimated coefficients on EPS.  The results suggest that when firms have stronger 
boards, firms facing a higher tax status use the corporate tax-deductible RSUs to a greater 
extent relative to firms facing a lower tax status, consistent with corporate tax planning 
hypothesis; such corporate tax planning is not evident when firms have weak boards, 
showing a sign of executive’s influence on equity compensation mix.44 
In this study, I assume that senior executives within the same firm face similar personal 
tax incentives, which may not be accurate.  Thus, in the next section (Section 6.6), I 
reestimate Equation (2) using a fixed effects model for the subsample of CEOs to alleviate 
the concern of the differences in personal tax incentives among different levels of executives 
within a firm.    
                                                   
44 I validate the unrestricted model using F-tests.  Consistently, the F statistics are significant at the one percent 
level, rejecting the null hypothesis that all the explanatory variables are simultaneously zero; however, I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that EPS and HIGH_TAX_V*EPS are zero.  The predictive ability of the unrestricted 
model may not extend to the inclusion of individual executive power proxy within the firm.  Additionally, an F-
test (untabulated) reveals the difference between the coefficients on POWER and HIGH_TAX_V*POWER is 
not statistically different from zero.   
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One noteworthy observation from the results presented in Table 7 is that the estimates 
of HIGH_TAX_V and POWER presented in column (1) are statistically significant using the 
full sample whereas the estimates of POWER and the interaction term 
HIGH_TAX_V*POWER presented in column (2) are statistically significant using the non-
family firm subsample.  I speculate that the results are different due to the significant 
variation in POWER measures between two dependent groups.  The summary statistics 
shown in Table 3 Panel A and B of two groups affirm such speculation.  Because the 
POWER variable has a higher degree of variation, albeit slow change across time within a 
firm, compared to HIGH_TAX_V in this regression, the POWER variable may be driving the 
results.  To test this assertion, I provide additional analysis in Section 6.6 reclassifying both 
tax incentives and managerial power as categorical variables.    
In summary, a fixed effects model using a non-family run firm subsample provides 
results that are consistent with the hypothesis that managerial power (or weak boards of 
directors) may hinder effective corporate tax planning despite a firm’s high corporate tax 
status.  The empirical evidence is not consistent with the view that firms’ tax incentives alone 
determines executive equity compensation structure.  The difference in managerial power 
measures between the family firms and non-family firms is significant and thus result in 
differences in estimates and inferences. 
6.6 Additional analyses 
I conduct additional analyses intended to provide a richer understanding of the relation 
between the RSU ratio and corporate tax planning, and how managerial power affects this 
relation.   Specifically, I examine whether (1) firms increase the use of corporate tax-
deductible RSUs when tax incentives are high despite managers’ potential influence, (2) the 
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primary results are robust to the corporate marginal tax rate as an alternative independent 
variable because corporate marginal tax rates are known to improve the understanding of 
compensation and tax strategy, and (3) CEO-only/CFO-only/Other Executive-only 
subsamples alleviate any differing personal tax incentives among top executives within a 
firm.  
To avoid the concerns that the corporate marginal tax rates and managerial power 
variables are slow changing over time and within-firm variation is also minimal, I redefine 
the tax variable, MTR, as follows.  I recompute MTR_V, a corporate tax planning variable, 
as an indicator variable TOP_TAX, taking the value of 1 for observations with MTR_V in 
the top quintile, and zero otherwise.  Similarly, I create an indicator variable, 
HIGH_POWER, taking the value of 1 for observations with POWER in the top quintile, and 
zero otherwise.  To be consistent with the HIGH_POWER classification, I also follow a 
similar procedure for Executive Pay Slice, resulting in HIGH_Executive Pay Slice 
(“HIGH_EPS”), an indicator variable, taking the value of 1 for observations with EPS in the 
top quintile, and zero otherwise. 
I next estimate the modified version of Equation (1) by incorporating TOP_TAX and 
HIGH_POWER explanatory variables resulting in Equation (2) as follows: 𝐑𝐒𝐔_𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 = 	𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝐓𝐎𝐏_𝐓𝐀𝐗𝐢,𝐣,𝐭X𝟑 + 𝛃𝟐𝐇𝐈𝐆𝐇_𝐏𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑𝐢,𝐣,𝐭^𝟏 + 𝛃𝟑𝐓𝐎𝐏_𝐓𝐀𝐗𝐢,𝐣,𝐭X𝟑∗ 𝐇𝐈𝐆𝐇_𝐏𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑𝐢,𝐣,𝐭^𝟏 +` 𝛃𝐢	𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐥𝐬𝐧𝐢c𝟒 + 𝛆𝐢,𝐣,𝐭 
Equation (2) 
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Equation (2) provides increased test power by creating a greater difference in expected 
corporate marginal tax rates and managerial power.45   
To provide some insight into the relation between the RSU ratio and the expected 
corporate tax rates and managerial power levels, I present the RSU ratio across corporate tax 
rates and managerial power levels for the non-family firm subsample in Table 8.  The mean 
value of the RSU ratio is 0.359 (0.469) for non-family firms expecting a high (low) tax rate.  
This finding is interpreted as the corporate tax rates have a negative association with the RSU 
ratio, not consistent with my prediction in H1.  The mean value of the RSU ratio is 0.457 
(0.445) for firms showing higher (lower) executive power in the non-family firm subsample.  
The mean value of the RSU ratio is 0.474 (0.441) for firms showing higher (lower) executive 
pay slice in the non-family firm subsample. 
[Table 8 about here.] 
I next estimate the Equation (2) using a firm fixed effects model with all non-family 
executive observations. The results are presented in Table 9. 
 [Table 9 about here.] 
Results of estimating Equation (2) are similar to prior results.  However, it is 
noteworthy that the coefficient on HIGH_POWER is negative and weakly significant at 10 
percent level (𝛽t = 	−0.02, 𝑡 = −1.28), consistent with H2, and the coefficient on 
HIGH_EPS is positive and statistically significant at 5 percent level (𝛽 = 	+0.02, 𝑡 =+1.95), opposite to H2 prediction.  Such inconsistent findings on the effect of POWER on 
the RSU ratio may be as a result of top executives with differing personal tax incentives.  
This firm fixed effects model shown in column (1) supports H3 that managerial power 
                                                   
45 For instance, executive power level may shift from the lowest to the highest when new executives bring in 
more expertise (and hence, the board relies more on executives).  Managers, therefore, may have power to 
negotiate equity compensation package of their preference. 
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weakens the impact of corporate tax planning on the RSU ratio. Additionally, the directions 
of the control variables are consistent with findings in the prior literature except that of stock 
performance.  Since expected higher stock performance increases the probability of stock 
options being in the money, it is not surprising to observe a negative coefficient.   
In summary, results indicate that high powered managers are more likely to be involved 
in creating their equity compensation design, and thus, weak corporate governance may 
hinder firms from using the most tax efficient compensation components, holding all else 
constant.   
To alleviate the concern of the differences in personal tax incentives among different 
levels of executives within a firm, as previously discussed, I next reestimate Equation (2) 
using the subsamples of CEOs, CFOs, and other executives.   I first present the summary 
statistics of the RSU ratios of CEO, CFO, and other executive subsamples across the 
corporate tax rates (high versus low) and managerial power level (high versus low) in Table 
10.  The mean value of the RSU ratio is 0.369 (0.487) for firms of the CEO subsample 
expecting a high (low) tax rate.  The mean value of the RSU ratio is 0.331 (0.468) for firms 
of the CFO subsample expecting a high (low) tax rate.  The mean value of the RSU ratio is 
0.365 (0.464) for firms of the other executive subsample expecting a high (low) tax rate.  
These findings are interpreted as the corporate tax rates have a negative association with the 
RSU ratio, not consistent with my prediction in H1, across all subsamples.  The mean value 
of the RSU ratio is 0.491 (0.456) for firms showing higher (lower) executive power in the 
CEO subsample.  The mean value of the RSU ratio is 0.435 (0.441) for firms showing higher 
(lower) executive power in the CFO subsample.  The mean value of the RSU ratio is 0.454 
(0.442) for firms showing higher (lower) executive power in the other executive subsample.  
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Except the CFO subsample, the findings are not consistent with my prediction in H2.  The 
mean value of the RSU ratio is 0.307 (0.485) for firms showing higher (lower) executive pay 
slice in the CEO subsample.  The mean value of the RSU ratio is 0.207 (0.446) for firms 
showing higher (lower) executive pay slice in the CFO subsample.  The mean value of the 
RSU ratio is 0.446 (0.444) for firms showing higher (lower) executive pay slice in the other 
executive subsample.  The findings are consistent with my prediction in H2, except in the 
case of the other executive subsample. 
[Table 10 about here.] 
The results of estimating Equation (2) are reported in Table 11.  Column (1) reports the 
results using the CEOs subsample, column (2) reports the results using the CFO subsample 
and column (3) reports the results using the other executives subsample. 
 [Table 11 about here] 
The empirical evidence supports the assertion that managerial power weakens the 
effect of corporate tax planning on RSU ratio, albeit with weak t-statistics.  The weak results 
may be due to a small number of observations (about 670 executive-year observations) in the 
CEO and CFO subsamples.  The results using CEO only and CFO only subsamples do not 
show inconsistent directions on managerial power measures (POWER and EPS), supporting 
my previous conjecture that top executives may have differing personal tax incentives.   The 
results on Other Executive only subsample share similar issues reported in Table 9.  A take 
away from these findings is that future research should consider differences in individual tax 
incentives among top executives. 
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6.7 Monitoring costs  
In this section, I include firm-specific idiosyncratic risk to operationalize the 
monitoring costs, following Core and Guay (1999).  Prior literature, particularly Core and 
Guay (1999), contends that the level of executive equity compensation grant can be 
explained by firm and executive-specific economic determinants, such as firm size, growth 
opportunities, monitoring costs, and executive risk preference measured by executive tenure.  
In their study, Core and Guay (1999) use idiosyncratic risk as a measure of monitoring costs.  
I control for firm-specific risk, measured by the variance of the residuals from a 36-month 
market model in the year prior to the equity grant, following Core and Guay (1999).  Prior 
studies (e.g., May 1995; Guay 1999; Bova et al. 2014) find that idiosyncratic risk has a 
negative association with employee stock holdings and a positive association with option 
holdings.  I assume that current grants are a proxy for executive equity holdings and predict a 
positive association with idiosyncratic risk and the RSU ratio.  I find the correlation between 
idiosyncratic risk and stock performance high (about -0.41) due to their similar construct 
(untabulated).   
I next present the summary statistics of the RSU ratios of the reduced subsample across 
the corporate tax rates (high versus low) and managerial power level (high versus low) in 
Table 12.  The mean value of the RSU ratio is 0.435 (0.512) for firms expecting a high (low) 
tax rate.  These findings are interpreted as the corporate tax rates have a negative association 
with the RSU ratio, not consistent with my prediction in H1.  The mean value of the RSU 
ratio is 0.528 (0.492) for firms showing higher (lower) executive power.  The mean value of 
the RSU ratio is 0.524 (0.494) for firms showing higher (lower) executive pay slice.  The 
findings are not consistent with my prediction in H2. 
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I reestimate Equation (2) using a firm fixed effects model.  Results tabulated in column 
(1) of Table 13 show that idiosyncratic risk has a significant positive association with the 
RSU ratio as predicted (𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	 = 	+0.024; 	𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 = +1.75), while previous 
inferences do not change significantly.   
[Table 12 about here.] 
[Table 13 about here.] 
6.8  Shareholder Activism  
In this section, I consider how shareholder activism influences corporate tax planning 
via shareholders’ power, as an opposing force to managerial power.  Shareholder activism46 
is defined as the active monitoring of traditionally passive large investors by submitting 
shareholder proposals during proxy seasons (Smith 1996).  Prior literature (e.g., Ferri and 
Sandino 2009) finds that shareholder activism, measured by the presence of a shareholder 
proposal on employee stock option expensing, affects compensation practices and leads firms 
to expense employee stock options during the 2003 and 2004 proxy seasons using a sample 
of U.S. firms.  Therefore, the presence of a shareholder proposal on executive compensation 
may constrain firms on the level and form of executive compensation because it indicates 
increased monitoring on executive compensation by the large shareholders.  I hand-collected 
my sample firms targeted by executive compensation proposals using the data made available 
by the Shareholder Association for Research & Education (SHARE) in Canada.  In some 
years, only 25 sample firms are targeted.  Unlike Gillian and Starks (2000), I did not identify 
whether the executive compensation proposals were submitted by the large shareholders and 
whether the proposals were successfully passed.  I simply use an indicator variable assigned 
                                                   
46 This test follows from a suggestion by faculty, summarized in my proposal letter, to examine the effect of 
shareholder activism. 
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as one for the presence of shareholder proposals related to executive compensation in the 
year prior to the grant year (𝑡 − 1), and zero otherwise.  I expect a positive association 
between the executive compensation structure and shareholder activism because the presence 
of the shareholder activism may constrain the impact of managerial power on the executive 
equity mix.  The correlation between the shareholder activism proxy and managerial power 
proxies are negative (untabulated).  I reestimate Equation (2) using a firm fixed effects 
model.  The results tabulated in column 2 of Table 13 show that the presence of shareholder 
activism has a significant positive association with the RSU ratio as predicted 
(𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	 = 	+0.044; 	𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 = +2.04), but inferences do not change significantly.   
To test whether the results reported in Table 13 are not due to the change in the sample 
composition, I reestimate Equation (2) using a fixed effects model, the same sample 
composition as in Table 13’s regression model, and HIGH_TAX_V as the corporate tax 
planning proxy without controlling for idiosyncratic risk and shareholder activism.  The 
results (untabulated) are similar when the regression model includes idiosyncratic risk and 
shareholder activism as control variables.  The results support H1 and H2, and weakly 
support H3.  The coefficient on HIGH_EPS is consistently positive and significant, 
indicating that individual tax incentives may differ among top executives. 
I also reestimate Equation (2) using a firm fixed model and employing bootstrap 
standard errors by replacing the independent indicator variables in Equation (2) (i.e., 
TOP_TAX/HMTR_V, POWER, and EPS) with representative continuous variables.  
Specifically, when HMTR_V is equal to one (zero), I assign a 30% (9%) corporate marginal 
tax rate to represent the highest (lowest) corporate tax rates.  When HIGH_POWER is equal 
to one (zero), I assign the value of -0.9 (+0.55) to represent the interquartile measures of 
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POWER.  When HIGH_EPS is equal to one (zero), I assign the value of 0.23 (0.13) to 
represent the interquartile measures of EPS (see Panel B of Table 3).  The results 
(untabulated) show that the effect sizes are different, but the inferences remain the same, 
except in the case of ex ante corporate marginal tax rates, the limitations of which will be 
discussed later. 
In summary, after controlling for idiosyncratic risk and shareholder activism, the 
results are consistent with the hypotheses that both corporate tax planning and managerial 
power affect the RSU ratio, and the expected mitigating effect of managerial power on the 
relation between RSU ratio and corporate tax planning is observed when firms have weak 
boards. 
6.9 Discussion on the limitation of using ex ante corporate marginal tax rates  
The caveats of using the simulated expected corporate marginal tax rates are as follows.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 3, the simulated corporate marginal tax rates of the sample 
firms at the vesting year range from 0 to 31% during my sample period.  Both Canadian 
employers and employees prefer employee tax-favoured stock options when the expected 
corporate marginal tax rates are below 33%, which is demonstrated in Inequality (2) of 
Appendix B.  Given the range of corporate marginal tax rates used in this study, corporate 
marginal tax rates are not high enough to provide corporate tax incentives in using a greater 
extent of corporate tax-deductible RSUs in executive compensation packages.  Thus, it is 
expected not to observe the relation between corporate tax planning and the executive equity 
mix when the corporate marginal tax rates are used as a corporate tax planning proxy.  
Another limitation is the measurement error associated with the corporate marginal tax rate 
simulation.  As previously explained in Section 5.3.3, computing the corporate marginal tax 
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rates at the vesting year requires the simulation of a stream of future taxable income and the 
extrapolation of future interest rates and statutory tax rates up to 26 years.   Compared to 
trichotomous measures of corporate tax status, which require the simulation of future taxable 
income up to three years as described in Section 5.3.2, the expected corporate marginal tax 
rates are noisy and could be perceived as less reliable than corporate tax statuses.  Because of 
these reasons, the results based on simulated corporate marginal tax rates are not as robust as 
those based on the trichotomous measures of the expected corporate tax status, and the 
inferences may not be reliable. 
6.10 Conclusions 
In summary, evidence presented in this chapter is generally consistent with the view 
that the executive equity compensation structure can be explained by both corporate tax 
planning and managerial power.  The empirical results also support that a greater level of tax 
incentives may go to managers when the board is weak. The evidence is generally consistent 
with predictions among non-family run firms inferring that managerial power of family 
firm’s executives may not be captured by conventional proxies. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
This paper examines the incremental predictability of tax planning and executive power 
on the design of equity compensation after controlling for economic determinants of 
compensation structure.  The mix of tax-deductible RSUs and employee tax-favoured options 
is considered a representation of equity compensation structure as a result of the tension 
between executive preference and firms’ tax incentives. 
The RSU ratio is regressed on corporate tax planning and managerial power proxies 
while controlling for cash constraints, dividend payout, earnings volatility, stock volatility, 
bankruptcy risk, firm size, stock performance, growth opportunities, idiosyncratic risk, and 
the presence of shareholder activism.  The empirical results support that managerial power 
explains the mix of tax-deductible RSUs and employee tax-favoured options granted to 
executives, particularly among firms that have weaker boards.  The results indicate that 
Canadian tax policy that treats the RSUs and stock options differently affects how firms 
determine the equity compensation mix, and weak boards may increase the effect size of 
managerial power. 
The study contributes to the literature on the determinants of executive equity 
compensation structure by providing evidence consistent with managers influencing their 
own compensation structure and differences in tax consequences at the firm and employee 
level may provide managers with a high tax incentive to do so. The evidence in this paper is 
particularly pertinent in light of recent Canadian tax policy discussion that questions the 
benefits of tax incentives at the employee level for stock option grants.  
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Appendix A 
Figures 
Figure 1 Classification of Employment-Related Equity Grants Based on Their Tax 
Consequences 
  At the Employee Level 
  100% taxable on employment 
income 
50% taxable on employment 
income or "One-half 
deduction" 
At the 
Employer 
Level 
Tax-
deductible 
 
Tax-deductible grants47  
(Group I) 
• RSUs or PSUs with cash or 
repurchased share payout (25% of 
total annual compensation) 
• Option cancellation with cash 
payout 48 
• SARs with cash payout (1% of 
total annual compensation);49 
 
[26% of total annual 
compensation] 
 
Non tax-
deductible 
 
Non tax-deductible grants50  
(Group III) 
• Restricted shares  
• RSUs or PSUs with newly issued 
or treasury share payout 
 
 
 
[2% of total annual compensation] 
Option grants  
(Group II) 
• At-the-money stock options 
(20.5% of total annual 
compensation) 
• SARs with share payout (no 
observations)  
 
[20.5% of total annual 
compensation]  
                                                   
47 Salary and annual incentives (bonuses) are typically cash compensation and are corporate tax deductible.  The 
cash amount is included in the employee’s taxable income at the grant date. 
48 I do not expect firms grant options expecting employees’ option cancellation prior to exercise date.  
Therefore, the tax consequence of a realized outcome is irrelevant. 
49 Tandem Stock Appreciation Rights (TSARs) account for 1% of total annual compensation, which I do not 
include in this classification.	
50 In a technical interpretation released by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) in 2017, the CRA indicates that 
it will not deny a corporate tax deduction on the cost of these share-based compensation plans if the employer 
does not have a legal obligation to issue shares to the employee (see Canada Revenue Agency, Document no 
2015-00600941I7, “Share Based Deferred Compensation – Section 7” released on 7 April 2017) 
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Figure 2 Change in Canadian Executive Compensation Structure During the Sample Period  
 
 
This figure shows that cash portion of executive compensation, represented by cash compensation divided by 
total compensation (“Cash ratio”), decreases from approximately 68% between 2006-2007 to approximately 
59% of the total compensation later in the sample period (2014-2015).  The use of tax-deductible RSUs, 
computed as RSU grants divided by total equity compensation (“RSU ratio”), increases from 25% during the 
2006-2007 period to above 55% of the total equity compensation later in the sample period. 
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Figure 3 Corporate and Top Marginal Personal Tax Rate Changes Between 2000-2015  
This figure illustrates the unique Canadian setting in which corporate statutory tax rate varies across time, using 
Ontario province as an example. The corporate tax rate in the U.S. does not change during this period. 
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Figure 4 Algorithm to Compute Future Tax Loss Carryforwards (An example)  
This figure illustrates how tax loss carryforward for vesting years are computed for the scenario when tax loss 
carryforward for year t-1 is zero and taxable income for the year t-2, t-1, and t are negative where year t is grant 
year, the year of interest. 
 
If TLCF(t)=0 and TIBTI(t-2)<0 and TIBTI(t-1)<0 and TIBTI(t) <0
TIBTI(t+1)>=0
Yes
TLCF (t+1)=0
TIBTI(t+2)>=0
Yes
TLCF(t+2)=0
No
TIBTI(t+1)+TIBTI(t+2)>=0 
Yes
TLCF(t+2)=0
No
TLCF(t+2)=(-1)*[TIBTI(t+1)+TIBTI(t+2)]
No 
TLCF (t+1)=(-1)*TIBTI(t+1)
TIBTI(t+2)>=0
Yes
TIBTI(t+2)-TLCF(t+1)>=0 
Yes
TLCF(t+2)=0
No
TLCF(t+2)=TIBTI(t+2)-TLCF(t+1)
No
TLCF(t+2)=TLCF(t+1)-
TIBTI(t+2)
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Figure 5 Illustration of Data Requirement to Simulate Corporate Marginal Tax Rate in Canada 
This figure explains data requirement to simulate ex ante corporate marginal tax rate in Canada.  (a) 
demonstrates why 23 years of simulated future corporate taxable income are necessary to compute at 
grant year; (b) demonstrates why 26 years of simulated future corporate taxable income are necessary 
to compute at vesting year. 
 
(a) This figure explains why 23 years of simulated future corporate taxable income are necessary to 
compute grant year corporate marginal tax rate in Canada. 
 
(b) This figure explains why 26 years of simulated future corporate taxable income are necessary to 
compute vesting year corporate marginal tax rate in Canada. 
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income in these 
three years can 
be offset against 
potential losses 
in year t.
(Any loss in 
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year 20.)20 years losses carryforward available for potential losses in year t.
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Figure 6 How Corporate Marginal Tax Rate is Computed 
This figure illustrates how corporate marginal tax rate is computed based on the existing literature.  
(a) is the main program, which summarizes four possible combinations of corporate taxable income 
before taxes and interest and tax loss carryforward.  (b)--(e) illustrate how corporate marginal tax 
rates are computed under four possible scenarios previously stated.  Algorithm is adapted by applying 
Shevlin (1990).  
(a) Main Program  
 
TIBTI (t) = Corporate taxable income before tax and interest at year t;  
TLCF(t-1) = tax loss carryforward at the end of year t-1 
  
Scenario 1: TIBTI (t) < 0 and TLCF (t-1) = 0?
Yes
Do Scenario 1
No
Scenario 2: TIBTI (t) < 0 and TLCF (t-1) > 0?
Yes
Do Scenario 2
No
Scenario 3: TIBTI (t) > 0 and TLCF(t-1) =0?
Yes
Do Scenario 3
No
Scenario 4: TIBTI (t) > 0 and TLCF (t-1) > 0?
Do Scenario 4
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Figure 6 (continued) 
(b) Scenario 1: TIBTI (t) < 0 and TLCF (t-1) = 0 
 
 
Note:  
TIBTI (t) = Corporate taxable income before tax and interest at year t; TLCF(t-1) = tax loss carryforward at 
year t-1 
MTR (t) = simulated corporate marginal tax rate at year t; STR (t) = expected statutory tax rate at year t 
  
TIBTI(t-3) or TIBTI (t-2) or TIBTI (t-1) > 0
Yes
Sum of positive TIBTI (t-3), TIBTI(t-2), and TIBTI(t-1) >= 
absolute value of TIBTI(t)
Yes
MTR(t)=STR(t)
No
The remainder of the losses will be: tlcf (t)=(-1)* 
(sum of positive TIBTI + TIBTI (t) ) >0
Scenario2
No
tlcf(t)=(-1)*(TIBTI(t))>0
Scenario 2
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Figure 6 (Continued) 
(c) Scenario 2: TIBTI (t) < 0 and TLCF (t-1) > 0 
 
 
Note:  
TIBTI (t) = Corporate taxable income before tax and interest at year t 
TLCF (t-1) = tax loss carryforward at the end of year t-1 
MTR (t) = simulated corporate marginal tax rate at year t 
STR (t) = expected statutory tax rate at year t 
INT (t) = interest rate at year t, which is the discount rate used to compute the present value of the tax payable  
 
  
TIBTI(t+1) to TIBTI (t+23) >=0
Yes
MTR(t)=STR(n)/[1+INT(n)] ^n
n is the year when the negative taxable 
income together with TLCF(t-1) is 
expected to be used up.
No
Do Scenario 3
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Figure 6 (Continued) 
(d) Scenario 3: TIBTI (t) > 0 and TLCF (t-1) = 0 
 
 
Note:  
TIBTI (t) = Corporate taxable income before tax and interest at year t 
TLCF (t-1) = tax loss carryforward at the end of year t-1 
MTR (t) = simulated corporate marginal tax rate at year t 
STR (t) = expected statutory tax rate at year t 
INT (t) = interest rate at year t, which is the discount rate used to compute the present value of the tax payable  
  
If negative taxable income is used up in year n, but one of the taxable income in year n+1 or n+2 
or n+3 is negative?
No
MTR(t)=STR (n)/[1+INT (n)] ^n
n is the year when the negative 
taxable income is expected to be 
used up.
Yes
MTR(t)=STR(t)-[STR(n)/(1+INT(n))] where n is the year when 
TIBIT (t) is used up by expected losses.
TIBTI (t) > 0  but one of the years, t+1 or 
t+2 or t+3 has a negative income
Yes
MTR(t)=STR(t)-[STR(n)/(1+INT(n))] where n is the year when TIBIT (t) is 
used up by expected losses.
No
MTR(t)=STR(t)
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Figure 6 (Continued) 
 (e) Scenario 4: TIBTI (t) > 0 and TLCF (t-1) > 0 
 
Note:  
TIBTI (t) = Corporate taxable income before tax and interest at year t 
TLCF (t-1) = tax loss carryforward at the end of year t-1 
MTR (t) = simulated corporate marginal tax rate at year t 
STR (t) = expected statutory tax rate at year t 
INT (t) = interest rate at year t, which is the discount rate used to compute the present value of the tax payable  
 
 
 
  
If TIBTI (t) - tlcf (t-1)>=0?  It means tlcf(t-1) used up at the year t.
Yes
Do Scenario 3
No
Do Scenario 2
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Appendix B 
A Simplified Tax Incentive Model 
To explain corporate tax incentives to use the corporate tax-deductible RSUs, I present the 
following algebraic model.  I assume 𝑡¬ as the expected corporate marginal tax rate at the vesting 
year; 𝑡­ as the top marginal personal tax rate at the vesting year.  The stock price at the exercise or 
vesting date is 𝑃.  The exercise price is 𝑋, and the number of stock option units is 𝑁.  I also assume 
that the expected payout on an RSU grant is the same as the expected payout on a stock option grant, 
i.e., 𝑃 = 𝑁 ∗ (𝑃 − 𝑋). 
I estimate the vesting date value of after-tax cost to the employer and after-tax value to the 
employee of various equity-based grants in the U.S. and Canada by applying respective tax policies.    
The second (third) column of Table B.1 presents the after-tax cost to the employer and after-tax value 
to the employee of the most prevalently used equity-based grants in the U.S. (Canada). 
 
Table B.1 Comparing After-tax Costs of Various Equity Grants Across U.S. and Canadian Tax 
Regimes 
 
Panel A: RSUs with payout in cash or repurchased shares (GROUP I) 
 U.S. (1) CANADA (1) 
After-tax cost to the employer 𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑡¬) 𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑡¬) 
After-tax value to the employee  𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑡­) 𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑡­) 
 
Panel B: Stock options (GROUP II) 
 U.S. (2) CANADA (2) 
After-tax cost to the employer 𝑁 ∗ (𝑃 − 𝑋) ∗ (1 − 𝑡¬) 𝑁 ∗ (𝑃 − 𝑋) 
After-tax value to the employee  𝑁 ∗ (𝑃 − 𝑋) ∗ ®1 − 𝑡­¯ 𝑁 ∗ (𝑃 − 𝑋) ∗ ®1 − 0.5𝑡­¯ 
 
Panel C: Restricted shares/RSUs with payout in newly issued or treasury shares (GROUP III) 
 U.S. (3) CANADA (3) 
After-tax cost to the employer 𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑡¬) 𝑃 
After-tax value to the employee  𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑡­) 𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑡­) 
From the employer’s perspective, on the exercise date (assuming the exercise date is the same 
as the vesting date), firms will prefer tax-deductible RSUs over employee tax-favoured stock options 
in Canada if: 
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 𝑚𝑎𝑥	(𝑁 ∗ (𝑃 − 𝑋), 0)(1 − 0.5t­)𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑁 ∗ (𝑃 − 𝑋),0) < P ∗	(1 − t­)P ∗ (1 − t¬)  
(Inequality 1) 
The left-hand side of the inequality  ³´µ	(¶∗(·^¸),¹)(t^¹.ºo»)³´µ(¶∗(·^¸),¹)   represents the ratio of the after-tax 
value of the stock options to the employee to the after-tax cost of the stock options to the employer.  
The right-hand side of the inequality ¼∗	(t^o»)¼∗(t^o½)  represents the ratio of the after-tax value of the RSUs to 
the employee to the after-tax cost of RSUs to the employer.  The above inequality can be simplified 
into  𝑡¬ > 0.5t­	1 − 0.5	t­ 
(Inequality 2) 
Therefore, if 𝑡¬ > ¹.ºo»	t^¹.ºo», the employer will prefer tax-deductible RSUs.   The employee will 
be indifferent between the employee tax-favoured stock options and corporate tax-deductible RSUs if 
the expected after-tax value of employee tax-favoured stock options is the same as that of corporate 
tax-deductible RSUs. 
Based on Inequality (2), it can also be observed that the employer’s and employee’s choices 
depend on their marginal tax rates.  Since the personal marginal tax rate of highly paid executives is 
typically in the top tax bracket and does not change much, the choice between RSUs and stock 
options depends on the corporate marginal tax rate at the vesting or exercise date.  It can be concluded 
that Canadian firms that are expecting corporate marginal tax rate above 32.89% will prefer corporate 
tax-deductible RSUs. 
To demonstrate how tax policies and individual and corporate marginal tax rates affect the 
after-tax cost to the employer, I present the after-tax cost of various equity-based instruments at 
various corporate marginal tax rates, applying current tax policies in the U.S. and Canada.  As 
explained in Chapter 2 of this study, the U.S. tax policies on various equity-based instruments are 
similar, whereas current Canadian tax policies on two main equity-based components vastly differ. 
Table B.2 presents the after-tax costs of various equity-based instruments in Canada at the 
expected corporate marginal tax rates 0%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 36.1%, holding the after-tax value to 
the employee constant at $100 and the expected personal marginal tax rate at 49.5% (the highest 
combined federal and provincial personal tax rate in Ontario).  
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The after-tax cost of tax-deductible RSUs (see Panel A, Table B.2) increases with decreasing 
corporate marginal tax rates under the Canadian tax regime, i.e., $127 at 36.1% to $198 at 0%.  
However, the after-tax cost of other equity grants does not change with the corporate marginal tax 
rate because these instruments are not tax-deductible at the employer level.  Furthermore, the after-tax 
cost of corporate tax-deductible RSUs is lower than the after-tax cost of employee tax-favoured stock 
options when a firm is expecting a high corporate marginal tax rate, i.e., $127 vs. $133 at the 
corporate marginal tax rate 36.1%.   
In summary, firms expecting a high corporate marginal tax rate prefer corporate tax-deductible 
RSUs to employee tax-favoured stock options. 
 
Table B.2 After-tax costs of Various Equity Grants in Canada 
Panel A: RSUs with payout in cash or repurchased shares (GROUP I) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expected Corporate Marginal Tax Rate 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 36.1% 
Expected Personal Marginal Tax Rate 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 
After-tax cost to the employer $198 $178 $159 $139 $127 
After-tax value to the employee constant $100  $100  $100  $100  $100  
Joint tax to the government at vesting  $98  $78  $59  $39  $27  
 
Panel B: Stock options (GROUP II) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expected Corporate Marginal Tax Rate 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 36.1% 
Expected Personal Marginal Tax Rate 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 
After-tax cost to the employer $133 $133 $133 $133 $133 
After-tax value to the employee constant $100  $100  $100  $100  $100  
Joint tax to the government at vesting  $33  $33  $33  $33  $33  
Panel C: Restricted shares/ RSUs with payout in newly issued or treasury shares (GROUP III) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expected Corporate Marginal Tax Rate 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 36.1% 
Expected Personal Marginal Tax Rate 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 
After-tax cost to the employer $198 $198 $198 $198 $198 
After-tax value to the employee constant $100  $100  $100  $100  $100  
Joint tax to the government at vesting  $98  $98  $98  $98  $98  
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Table A.3 presents the after-tax costs of various equity-based instruments in the U.S. at the 
expected corporate marginal tax rates 0%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 35%, holding the after-tax value to the 
employee constant at $100 and the expected personal marginal tax rate at 39.6%.  The after-tax cost 
of equity-based instruments increases from $108 to $166 when corporate marginal tax rate decreases 
from 35% to 0%.  As a result of similar tax treatments among all equity-based instruments, i.e., the 
compensation expense related to any equity grants is tax-deductible at the employer level, and the 
payout from any equity grants is taxed at the employee level when these equity grants vest, the after-
tax costs to the employer does not change across equity grants.  
In summary, since the after-tax cost of equity grants does not change across equity grants, firms 
may be indifferent on the choice of equity types. 
Table B.3 After-tax Costs of Various Equity Grants in the U.S (A Numerical Example) 
Panel A: RSUs with payout in cash or repurchased shares (GROUP I) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expected Corporate Marginal Tax Rate 0% 10% 20% 30% 35% 
Expected Personal Marginal Tax Rate 39.5% 39.5% 39.5% 39.5% 39.5% 
After-tax cost to the employer $166 $149 $132 $116 $108 
After-tax value to the employee constant $100  $100  $100  $100  $100  
Joint tax to the government at vesting  $66  $49  $32  $16  $8  
Panel B: Stock options (GROUP II) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expected Corporate Marginal Tax Rate 0% 10% 20% 30% 35% 
Expected Personal Marginal Tax Rate 39.5% 39.5% 39.5% 39.5% 39.5% 
After-tax cost to the employer $166 $149 $132 $116 $108 
After-tax value to the employee constant $100  $100  $100  $100  $100  
Joint tax to the government at vesting  $66  $49  $32  $16  $8  
Panel C: Restricted shares/ RSUs with payout in newly issued or treasury shares (GROUP III) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expected Corporate Marginal Tax Rate 0% 10% 20% 30% 35% 
Expected Personal Marginal Tax Rate 39.5% 39.5% 39.5% 39.5% 39.5% 
After-tax cost to the employer $166 $149 $132 $116 $108 
After-tax value to the employee constant $100  $100  $100  $100  $100  
Joint tax to the government at vesting  $66  $49  $32  $16  $8  
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Summary and conclusions 
The after-tax costs of equity grants differ because of differential tax treatments at the employer 
and employee levels in Canada.  Firms expecting a higher corporate marginal tax rate at the vesting 
year have the opportunity to lower the after-tax compensation cost by using corporate tax deductible 
RSUs.  Thus, I posit that the proportion of the corporate tax-deductible RSUs in executive equity-
based compensation increases with increasing corporate marginal tax rate among Canadian firms.   
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Procedure to Simulate a Stream of Future Corporate Taxable Income Using a 
Non-Parametric Model 
The following is the outline of the procedure that I used to simulate future taxable income.  
This procedure is a modified version of the procedure used in the study of Blouin et al. (2010). 
Step 1: 
The first step computes corporate taxable income TIBTIt described in section 5.3.1 and the Average 
total assets of each Canadian firm available on COMPUSTAT at year t,51 where 𝑇𝐼𝐵𝑇𝐼 = 𝑃𝐼 + 	𝐼𝑁𝑇	– 	𝐷𝑇𝐸 + 𝑃𝑇_𝐸𝑋_𝐷𝐼𝑆 + 𝑆𝑃𝐼 
and 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠	𝑎𝑡	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝑡	= 	 [𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑜𝑓	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠	 + 	𝐸𝑛𝑑	𝑜𝑓	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠]/2 
 
The variable descriptions are as follows.   
PI= Pretax income, COMPUSTAT item PI, which is operating and non-operating income 
before provisions for income taxes and minority interest; 
INT= financial statement interest expense (COMPUSTAT item XINT) plus the interest portion 
of rental payments, one-third of total rental payment XRENT as suggested in Mills and 
Graham (2008); 
DTE= Deferred income taxes (COMPUSTAT item TXDI) divided by combined federal and 
provincial statutory tax rate; 
PT_EX_DIS= Pretax extraordinary items and discontinued operations, which is 
(COMPUSTAT item XIDO) divided by (1- combined federal and provincial statutory 
tax rate); 
SPI = Special items which is COMPUSTAT item SPI. 
 
Step 2: 
I compute ROAt, which is defined as TIBITt divided by Average total assets at year t computed in 
Step 1.  Observations that belonged to financial firms are dropped as none of my sample firms are 
from financial institutions.  Observations with missing ROAt and Average total assets at year t are 
eliminated.  I rank observations based on ROA (t-2), which is TIBTI (t-2)/Average total assets (t-2). 
Next, I group the negative ROA (t-2) and the positive ROA (t-2) separately, and each group is further 
divided into several groups with an equal number of firms in each group.  To have the same number 
of firms in each group, positive ROA (t-2) firms are further divided into four groups, and negative  
                                                   
51 The subscript `t’ is suppressed in the following equation. 
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ROA (t-2) are further divided into three to six groups, depending on the number of negative ROA(t-2) 
firms each year.  Within each group, firms are ranked based on Average total assets (t-2) and further 
divided into five groups, resulting a total of 35 performance-size groups. 
 
Step 3: 
Compute ΔROA (t-1)=ROA (t-1) - ROA (t-2) 
Compute Assets growth (t-1)= Average total assets (t-1)/Average total assets (t-2) 
 
Step 4: 
Use TIBTI and average total assets of sample firms at year t (i.e., for the period 2005-2015), draw a 
random firm (j) from the group, which was ranked based on TIBTI (t-2)/Average total assets (t-2) and 
Average total assets (t-2), that matches the sample firm’s TIBTI (t) and Average total assets (t). 
 
Step 5: 
Using the random firm’s (firm j’s) ΔROA (t-1) and Assets growth (t-1), I estimate 𝑇𝐼𝐵𝑇𝐼(𝑡 + 1)ÉÊ  as 
follows. 𝑇𝐼𝐵𝑇𝐼	(𝑡 + 1)Ê =	𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡 + 1)ÉÊ ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑡 + 1)ÉÊ  
where  𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡 + 1)ÉÊ = 𝑅𝑂𝐴	(𝑡)Ë 	+	𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴	(𝑡 − 1)Í  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑡 + 1)ÉÊ = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠	(𝑡)Ë ∗ 	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	(𝑡 − 1)Í  
 
Step 6: 
Using ROA(t + 1)ÏÊ  and Average	total	assets	(t + 1)ÏÊ , I repeat Step 5 and estimate 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡 + 2)ÉÊ , 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠	(𝑡 + 2)ÉÊ  and 𝑇𝐼𝐵𝑇𝐼	(𝑡 + 2)Ê . 
 
Step 7: 
Using 𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑡 + 2)ÉÊ , 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠	(𝑡 + 2)ÉÊ , I repeat Step 5 and 6 to estimate 𝑇𝐼𝐵𝑇𝐼	(𝑡 + 3)Ê .  
  
To account for the distribution as well as the mean of future corporate taxable income, I repeat the 
estimation step (Step 5 to Step 7) 50 times.  This simulation is similar to the Monte Carlo experiment. 
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Variable Description 
Dependent variables 𝑹𝑺𝑼	𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 A proxy to measure executive equity compensation mix, which is defined as: 𝑅𝑆𝑈_𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡Ë,Í,Ô𝑅𝑆𝑈	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡Ë,Í,Ô + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡Ë,Í,Ô 
where: 𝑅𝑆𝑈_𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡Ë,Í,Ô                   = Grant date value of tax deductible share-based grants, which 
include RSUs or PSUs with cash or repurchased share payout, 
granted to executive 𝑖 of firm 𝑗 at grant year 𝑡; 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡Ë,Í,Ô                = Black-Scholes grant date value of employee tax-favoured at-
the-money stock option granted to executive 𝑖 of firm 𝑗 at 
grant year 𝑡; 
 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉	𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 A proxy to measure executive total compensation mix, which is defined as: 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ	𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛Ë,Í,Ô𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛Ë,Í,Ô  
where: 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ	𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛Ë,Í,Ô    = Grant date value of total cash compensation, which includes 
annual salary and bonus, granted to executive 𝑖 of firm 𝑗 at 
grant year 𝑡; 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛Ë,Í,Ô   = Grant date value of total compensation, which includes both 
total cash compensation and equity compensation, granted to 
executive 𝑖 of firm 𝑗 at grant year 𝑡; 
Independent variables 
Corporate tax planning proxies 
Proxy 1 
(MTR_V) 
Expected corporate marginal tax rate at vesting year.  MTR_V is defined as the present 
value of the change in taxes payable in the present and future for a dollar increase in 
corporate taxable income at the vesting year.  I estimated MTR_V using a non-parametric 
corporate taxable income model following Blouin et al. 2010.  I followed their method by 
writing an iterative computer program.  First, I simulated the future corporate taxable 
income using the nonparametric model developed by Blouin et al. 2010.  Next, I computed 
the corporate marginal tax rate using the method described in Shevlin (1990).  (Source: 
used COMPUSTAT data for simulation) 
 
TOP_TAX An indicator variable assigned 1 if MTR_V, defined as above, is in the top quintile, and 
zero otherwise. 
LOW_TAX An indicator variable assigned 1 if MTR_V, defined as above, is in the bottom quintile and 
zero otherwise. 
  
Continued on next page- 
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Variable Description 
Independent variables (continued) 
Corporate tax planning proxies  
Proxy 2 
(Corporate tax status at 
vesting year:  HIGH_TAX_V 
and LOW_TAX_V) 
 
 
Dichotomous measures 52of corporate tax status applied in Klassen and 
Mawani (2000) using modified measures of estimated corporate taxable 
income suggested by Blouin et al. (2010) and Mills and Graham (2008) as 
follows: 𝑇𝐼𝐵𝑇𝐼 = 𝑃𝐼 + 	𝐼𝑁𝑇	– 	𝐷𝑇𝐸 + 𝑃𝑇_𝐸𝑋_𝐷𝐼𝑆 + 𝑆𝑃𝐼 
where: 
TIBTI             = Corporate taxable income before taxes and interest 
PI                   = Pretax income, COMPUSTAT item PI, which is operating 
and non-operating income before provisions for income taxes 
and minority interest at grant year; 
INT                 = financial statement interest expense (COMPUSTAT item 
XINT) plus the interest portion of rental payments, one-third 
of total rental payment XRENT as suggested in Mills and 
Graham (2008) at grant year; 
DTE               = Deferred income taxes (COMPUSTAT item TXDI) divided by 
combined federal and provincial statutory tax rate at grant 
year; 
PT_EX_DIS   = Pretax extraordinary items and discontinued operations, which 
is (COMPUSTAT item XIDO) divided by (1- combined 
federal and provincial statutory tax rate) at grant year; 
SPI                 = Special items which is COMPUSTAT item SPI at grant year. 
 
HIGH_TAX_V An indicator variable one for observations with no tax loss carry forward (tlcf) 
and estimated positive corporate taxable income (TIBTI as defined above) for 
three consecutive years following the grant year, and zero otherwise. 
LOW_TAX_V An indicator variable one for observations with positive tax loss carry forward 
and/or estimated negative corporate taxable income (TIBTI as defined above) 
for three consecutive years following the grant year, and zero otherwise. 
Continued on next page- 
 
                                                   
52 Prior literature uses trichotomous measures, i.e., high, moderate, and low tax statuses.  I combine the 
moderate tax status group with the low tax status group because low tax group consists a small number of 
observations.  This combination results in dichotomous measures of corporate tax status (HIGH_TAX_V and 
LOW_TAX_V), instead of trichotomous measures.   
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Variable Description 
Independent variables (continued) 
Managerial Power proxy  
POWER A component of Managerial Power, a factor variable created from principal component 
analysis of the board-related variables, BOARD SIZE, INSIDERS, OWNERSHIP 
CONCENTRATION and INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP. 
 
BOARD SIZE Natural logarithmic function of the number of directors (Source: Hand-collected from 
Management circulars) 
 
INSIDERS The proportion of insiders as board members (Source: Hand-collected from 
Management circulars) 
OWNERSHIP 
CONCENTRATION 
The proportion of firm shares owned by the largest shareholders (Source: FACTSET 
via WRDS) 
 
INSTITIONAL 
OWNERSHIP 
The proportion of institutional ownership (Source: FACTSET via WRDS) 
 
 
EXECUTIVE PAY SLICE 
(EPS) 
A component of managerial power proxy, which is the proportion of the total 
compensation paid to the top five executives that goes to an executive (Source: 
Constructed from hand-collected compensation data) 
 
Control Variables  
CASH_CONSTR Cash constraint, measured as the average over year t-2, t-1, and t of [(Common and 
preferred dividends (DVC+DVP) – cash flow from investing (INVCF) – cash flow 
from operations (OANCF))/ total assets (AT)] for firm j (Core and Guay 1999; Carter 
et al. 2007). (Source: COMPUSTAT) 
 
RISK_PREF Executive wealth in terms of stocks and options holding at the grant date. 
(Source: Manual data collection for Canadian executives from management circulars) 
DIV_PAYOUT The dividend payout, computed as the average of dividends per share divided by price 
per dividend over the period t-2, t-1, and t (Carter et al. 2007). 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
Continued on next page- 
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Variable Description 
EARN_VOL Earnings volatility, measured as the variance of 𝑅𝑂𝐴 (Carter et al. 2007).  
Source: COMPUSTAT 
 
STOCK_VOL Stock volatility (Boyle et al. 2011), measured as the standard deviation of unadjusted 
daily returns over the 12 months following the grant year, 𝑡 + 1.  Source: CFMRC 
 
Z-SCORE Bankruptcy risk as defined in Altman (1968) and applied in Kadan and Swinkels 
(2008).  It is measured as follows: 𝑍 = 1.2	𝑊𝐶 + 1.4𝑅 + 3.3	𝑃𝐼 + 0.6	𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 1.0	𝑆	 
where: 
WC is net working capital. 
R is retained earnings. 
PI is pretax income. 
MKT is market value of equity. 
S is sales.  All right-hand-side variables, except market value of equity, are scaled by 
total assets.  Market value of equity is scaled by total liabilities.  Observations with the 
negative Z-score are to be eliminated. 
(Source: COMPUSTAT) 
 
LN_ASSET Natural log of total assets (AT) for firm 𝑗 at the end of year 𝑡. 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
BOOK_MKT Book value of equity/market value of equity at the end of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑗 (Feltham 
and Wu 2001). 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
RET Stock performance, measured as cumulative monthly stock returns at grant year 𝑡 for 
firm 𝑗 (Murphy 1985) (Source: CFMRC) 
INDUSTRY Industry fixed effects, using industry dummies as defined in COMPUSTAT variable 
(ggroup)  
Continued on next page- 
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Variable Description 
TIBTI Grant year corporate taxable income before taxes and interests computed as follows: 𝑇𝐼𝐵𝑇𝐼 = 𝑃𝐼 + 	𝐼𝑁𝑇	– 	𝐷𝑇𝐸 + 𝑃𝑇_𝐸𝑋_𝐷𝐼𝑆 + 𝑆𝑃𝐼 
 
where: 
PI= Pretax income, COMPUSTAT item PI, which is operating and non-operating 
income before provisions for income taxes and minority interest at grant year; 
 
INT= financial statement interest expense (COMPUSTAT item XINT) plus the interest 
portion of rental payments, one-third of total rental payment XRENT as 
suggested in Mills and Graham (2008) at grant year; 
 
DTE= Deferred income taxes (COMPUSTAT item TXDI) divided by combined 
federal and provincial statutory tax rate53 at grant year; 
 
PT_EX_DIS= Pretax extraordinary items and discontinued operations, which is 
(COMPUSTAT item XIDO) divided by (1- combined federal and provincial 
statutory tax rate54) at grant year; 
 
SPI = Special items which is COMPUSTAT item SPI at grant year. 
 
TLCF Tax loss carryforward 
HIGH_TAX_G High tax paying status at grant date; an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm has 
positive corporate taxable income (TIBTI>0) and no non-capital loss carryforwards 
(TLCF=0) in the three years prior to the grant year, and zero otherwise. 
LOW_TAX_G Low tax paying status at grant date; an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm has 
negative corporate taxable income (TIBTI<=0) and positive non-capital loss 
carryforwards (TLCF>0) in the three years prior to the grant year, and zero otherwise. 
MOD_TAX_G Moderate tax paying status at grant date; an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm 
has negative corporate taxable income (TIBTI<=0) or zero non-capital loss 
carryforwards (TLCF>0) in the three years prior to the grant year, and zero otherwise. 
  
                                                   
53 The location of the head office found in COMPUSTAT is used to determine the relevant provincial tax rate 
following Klassen et al. (2004). 
54 Same as above footnote. 
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Appendix E 
Tables 
TABLE 1 Sample Selection 
Panel A: Summary of Sample Selection Procedure 
 Number of 
Firms 
At firm level,  
Largest Canadian firms traded on Toronto stock exchange (September 18, 2016) 247 
Restricted to:  
Non-financial Canadian firms 197 
Executive compensation data availability using proxy statements available on 
SEDAR filing system 
143 
 
 # of Executive-
years 
At executive-year level,  
Top executive-level compensation data collected for the period 2005-2015  7,509 
Less: Observations with fewer than five top executives’ annual compensation data  (514) 
Less: Missing Cash Constraint proxy  (95) 
Less: Missing Dividend Payout proxy (35) 
Less: Missing Earnings Volatility (175) 
Less: Missing Stock volatility  (55) 
Less: Missing Stock performance (815) 
Less: Missing Bankruptcy risk proxies (210) 
Less: Missing Book to Market ratio (10) 
Top five executive-level compensation data with available annual COMPUSTAT 
and CFMRC data (138 unique firms) (See Summary statistics in Table 2, Panel A.) 
5,600 
 
Data screening to test hypotheses: 
 
Less: Firms that grant non tax-deductible shares in some years (13 firms) (345) 
Less: Observations in which the compensation package does not include both tax-
deductible RSUs and employee tax-favoured options 
(1,030) 
Less: Missing main explanatory variables  (45) 
Total observations before removing influential observations (128 unique firms) 4,180 
Less: Influential observations identified using Cook’s D (4/N-k-1) (197) 
Total observations used in testing the hypotheses (127 unique firms for the period 
2006-2015) (See Summary statistics in Table 2, Panel B.) 
3,983 
Restricted to non-family run firms only (111 unique firms) 3,474 
Continued on next page: 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Distribution of Observations Across Sample Period 
 Initial 
data 
 Top five 
executives’ 
data 
 Full 
sample 
 Non-
family 
firm 
sample 
 
Year # of obs. % # of obs. % # of obs. % # of obs.  % 
2005 631 8.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
2006 653 8.8 455 8.1 242 6.1 213 6.1 
2007 655 8.7 470 8.4 280 7.0 244 7.0 
2008 678 9.0 520 9.3 316 7.9 264 7.6 
2009 691 9.2 570 10.2 361 9.1 312 9.0 
2010 694 9.3 590 10.5 397 10.0 340 9.8 
2011 702 9.3 530 9.5 423 10.6 367 10.6 
2012 706 9.4 625 11.2 494 12.4 440 12.7 
2013 702 9.3 625 11.2 515 12.9 454 13.1 
2014 703 9.4 640 11.4 516 13.0 458 13.2 
2015 694 9.2 575 10.3 439 11.0 382 11.0 
Total 7,509 100.0 5,600 100.0 3,983 100.0 3,474 100.0 
# of firms 143  138  127  111  
# of 
executives 
1,705  1,447  1,160  1,037  
Continued on next page: 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Panel C: Industry Distribution 
 Initial Data 
(N=7,509) 
Top five 
executives' data 
(N=5,600) 
Full sample 
(N=3,983) 
 
Non-Family 
firm sample 
(N=3,474) 
Industry 
# of 
firms % 
# of 
firms % 
# of 
firms % 
# of 
firms % 
Material Extraction 39 29.4 39 28.3 35 26.9 33 29.7 
Energy sector (Oil & gas) 31 21.7 30 21.7 29 24.4 28 25.2 
Manufacturing of Capital Goods 11 7.7 11 8.0 11 9.2 10 9.0 
Utilities 9 7.0 10 7.2 8 5.0 7 6.3 
Food & Staples Retailers 7 4.9 7 5.1 7 5.9 4 3.6 
Cable & Satellites, Broadcasting, and 
Entertainment 
6 4.2 6 4.3 6 5.0 4 3.6 
Software & Services 6 4.2 6 4.3 5 2.5 5 4.5 
Commercial & Professional Services 5 3.5 4 2.9 3 4.2 2 1.8 
Transportation 5 3.5 5 3.6 5 4.2 5 4.5 
Telecommunication Services 4 2.8 4 2.9 4 3.4 3 2.7 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 3 2.1 3 2.2 3 1.7 3 2.7 
Automobiles & Components Manufacturers 2 1.4 2 1.4 2 1.7 1 0.9 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 2 1.4 2 1.4 2 0.8 2 1.8 
Consumer Services 2 1.4 2 1.4 2 1.7 2 1.8 
Retailing 2 1.4 2 1.4 2 1.7 1 0.9 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 2 1.4 2 1.4 2 1.7 0 0.0 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life 
Sciences 
2 1.4 2 1.4 1 0.0 1 0.9 
Health Care Equipment & Services 1 0.7 1 0.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 143 100 138 100 127 100 111 100 
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TABLE 2 Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables ($ amounts in millions) 
Panel A: Initial Sample 
Variable N Mean Std. 
dev. 
Median P25 P75 Min. Max. 
Salary  5600 0.472  0.306  0.397  0.285  0.561  0.000  6.039  
Bonus  5600 0.480  0.781  0.263  0.126  0.527  0.000  11.200  
(1) Cash compensation 
 (Salary + Bonus) 
5600 0.953  0.999  0.663  0.438  1.082  0.000  12.700  
(2) Share appreciation rights 
value(SARs) 
5600 0.010  0.104  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  3.023  
(3) Tax-deductible RSU/PSU value 5600 0.465  1.505  0.040  0.000  0.469  0.000  84.800  
(4) Non tax-deductible RSU value  5600 0.033  0.245  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  6.624  
(5) Employee tax-favoured Options 5600 0.384  0.860  0.114  0.000  0.406  0.000  22.000  
(6) Tandem SARs value (TSARs) 5600 0.017  0.179  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  5.010  
Total annual compensation  
(Sum of item 1-6) 
5600 1.885  2.332  1.211  0.691  2.226  0.000  85.800  
Dependent variable – Ratios         
Cash Ratio 5600 0.641  0.262  0.625  0.071  0.445  0.882  1.000  
RSU Ratio  4473 0.450 0.390 0.500 0.000 0.754 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Full Sample for Hypotheses Testing  
Variable N Mean Std. 
dev. 
Median P25 P75 Min. Max. 
Salary  3983 0.492 0.307 0.416 0.305 0.581 0.000 6.039 
Bonus  3983 0.463 0.633 0.286 0.147 0.538 0.000 9.786 
(2) Cash compensation 
 (Salary + Bonus) 
3983 0.954 0.865 0.710 0.472 1.100 0.000 10.700 
(2) Share appreciation rights value 
(SARs) 
3983 0.002 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
(3) Tax-deductible RSU/PSU value 3983 0.577 1.696 0.197 0.000 0.637 0.000 84.800 
(4) Non tax-deductible RSU value  3983 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(5) Employee tax-favoured Options 3983 0.501 0.937 0.231 0.053 0.559 0.000 22.000 
(6) Tandem SARs value (TSARs) 3983 0.024 0.211 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.010 
Total annual compensation  
(Sum of item 1-6) 
3983 2.115 2.527 1.375 0.821 2.539 0.118 85.800 
Dependent variable – Ratios         
Cash Ratio 3983 0.543 0.191 0.539 0.414 0.686 0.000 0.995 
RSU Ratio  3983 0.436 0.379 0.500 0.000 0.750 0.000 1.000 
Continued on next page: 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel C: Non-family Owned Firm Subsample 
Variable N Mean Std. 
dev 
Median P25 P75 Min. Max. 
Salary  3474 0.470 0.294 0.400 0.296 0.547 0.000 6.039 
Bonus  3474 0.417 0.549 0.265 0.141 0.499 0.000 9.786 
(3) Cash compensation 
 (Salary + Bonus) 
3474 0.886 0.770 0.670 0.455 1.038 0.000 10.700 
(2) Share appreciation rights value 
(SARs) 
3474 0.003 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
(3) Tax-deductible RSU/PSU value 3474 0.576 1.774 0.201 0.000 0.625 0.000 84.800 
(4) Non tax-deductible RSU value  3474 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(5) Employee tax-favoured Options 3474 0.492 0.958 0.220 0.046 0.536 0.000 22.000 
(6) Tandem SARs value (TSARs) 3474 0.016 0.166 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.297 
Total annual compensation  
(Sum of item 1-6) 
3474 2.024 2.526 1.328 0.800 2.419 0.118 85.800 
Dependent variable – Ratios         
Cash Ratio 3474 0.535 0.189 0.533 0.408 0.669 0.000 0.995 
RSU Ratio  3474 0.447 0.383 0.500 0.000 0.750 0.000 1.000 
Table 2: Panel A presents summary statistics of executive compensation components of 5,600 executive-year 
observations for the period 2006-2015 (138 unique firms); Panel B presents summary statistics of executive 
compensation components of 3,983 executive-year observations (119 unique firms) used in hypotheses testing;  
Panel C presents summary statistics of executive compensation components of 3,474 executive-year 
observations for non-family firms used in hypotheses testing.  
Salary is the total salary of the executive for the grant year.   
Bonus is the total bonus of the executive for the grant year.   
Cash compensation is the total of salary and bonus paid to the executive for the grant year. 
Share appreciation rights value is the total value of SARs granted to the executive for the grant year. 
Tax-deductible RSU/PSU value is the total value of restricted share units (RSUs) and performance share units 
(PSUs), which are to be satisfied at maturity date with cash payment or shares repurchased in the market, 
granted to the executive for the grant year. 
Non tax-deductible RSU value is the total value of RSUs, PSUs and restricted shares, which are to be satisfied at 
the maturity date with treasury shares or new shares, and outright shares granted to the executive for the 
grant year. 
Employee tax-favoured option value is the total disclosed Black-Scholes value of employee tax-favoured stock 
options granted to the executive for the year.  If the compensation table does not disclose the option value, 
the option value is computed using the Black-Scholes method.  The input parameters disclosed in annual 
reports are used.  
Tandem SARs value is the total value of tandem share appreciation rights (TSARs) granted to the executive for 
the grant year.  TSARs are the stock option grants attached with share appreciation rights, which are 
redeemable either as options or in cash for the value of share appreciation at the maturity date.  
Total annual compensation is the total value of cash compensation, share appreciation rights, tax-deductible 
RSU/PSU, non-tax-deductible RSUs, employee tax-favoured options, TSARs granted to the executive for 
the year. 
Cash Ratio is the proportion of total cash compensation (item 1) to the total annual compensation granted to the 
executive.   
RSU Ratio is the proportion of the value of tax-deductible RSU grants to the sum of the value of tax deductible 
RSUs and employee tax-favoured options granted to the executive for the year. 
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TABLE 3 Summary Statistics of Independent Variables Used in Hypothesis testing 
PANEL A: Full Sample for Hypotheses Testing 
Variable N Mean Std. 
dev. 
Median P25 P75 Min. Max. 
High Corporate Tax Status  
(HMTR_V=1) 
1558        
Low Corporate Tax Status  
(HMTR_V=0) 
2425        
Corporate Marginal tax rate  
(At Grant Year, t) 
3983 0.18 0.07 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.00 0.38 
Corporate Marginal tax rate  
(At year t +1) 
3983 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.08 0.34 
Corporate Marginal tax rate 
(At year t +2) 
3983 0.19 0.04 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.09 0.31 
Corporate Marginal tax rate  
(At year t +3) 
3983 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.21 0.09 0.31 
Top corporate tax status  
(TOP_TAX=1) 
694        
Low corporate tax status  
(TOP_TAX=0) 
3289        
Managerial Power 3983 – 0.09 1.00 0.02 – 0.79 0.68 – 3.51 1.67 
    LN (Board size) 3983 2.27 0.29 2.30 2.08 2.48 1.10 2.89 
    % of insiders 3983 0.23 0.12 0.20 0.11 0.33 0.00 0.57 
    Institutional ownership 3983 0.40 0.29 0.36 0.15 0.64 0.00 1.00 
    % of large ownership 3983 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.59 
High Managerial Power 
(HIGH_POWER=1) 
693        
Low Managerial Power 
(HIGH_POWER=0) 
3290        
Executive pay slice (EPS) 3983 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.24 0.02 0.89 
High Executive pay slice 
(High_EPS=1) 
694        
Low Executive pay slice 
(High_EPS=0) 
2780        
Cash constraint 3983 0.02 0.08 0.01 – 0.02 0.05 – 0.35 0.48 
Dividend payout 3983 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.15 
Earnings volatility 3983 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.22 
Stock volatility 3983 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.45 
Bankruptcy risk 3983 6.35 21.84 3.11 1.97 5.20 0.06 469.06 
LN (Assets) 3983 8.20 1.42 8.12 7.22 9.29 3.41 11.35 
Performance (RET) 3983 0.17 0.50 0.11 – 0.09 0.32 – 0.88 6.44 
Book to market ratio 3983 0.62 0.53 0.50 0.34 0.73 0.00 7.41 
Idiosyncratic risk 3145  1.19   0.90   1.12   0.54  1.76  – 0.84  4.25  
CEO = 1 770        
CFO = 1 762        
OTHER EXECUTIVES = 1 2451        
Shareholder Activism = 1 194        
Shareholder Activism = 0 3789        
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
PANEL B: Non-Family Owned Firm Subsample 
Variable N Mean Std. 
dev. 
Median P25 P75 Min. Max. 
High Corporate Tax Status  
(HMTR_V=1) 
1265        
Low Corporate Tax Status  
(HMTR_V=0) 
2209        
Corporate Marginal tax rate  
(At Grant Year, t) 
3474 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.38 
Corporate Marginal tax rate  
(At year t +1) 
3474 0.18 0.05 0.17 0.14 0.21 0.08 0.34 
Corporate Marginal tax rate 
(At year t +2) 
3474 0.19 0.04 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.09 0.31 
Corporate Marginal tax rate  
(At year t +3) 
3474 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.21 0.09 0.31 
Top corporate tax status  
(TOP_TAX=1) 
  694        
Low corporate tax status  
(TOP_TAX=0) 
2780        
Managerial Power 3474 –0.21 0.99 –0.12 –0.90 0.55 –3.51 1.67 
    LN (Board size) 3474 2.23 0.27 2.20 2.08 2.40 1.10 2.77 
    % of insiders 3474 0.21 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.29 0.00 0.57 
    Institutional ownership 3474 0.41 0.30 0.37 0.16 0.67 0.00 1.00 
    % of large ownership 3474 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.59 
High Managerial Power 
(HIGH_POWER=1) 
  695        
Low Managerial Power 
(HIGH_POWER=0) 
2780        
Executive pay slice (EPS) 3474 0.20 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.23 0.02 0.89 
High Executive pay slice 
(High_EPS=1) 
  694        
Low Executive pay slice 
(High_EPS=0) 
2780        
Cash constraint 3474 0.03 0.08 0.02 –0.02 0.05 –0.22 0.48 
Dividend payout 3474 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.15 
Earnings volatility 3474 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.22 
Stock volatility 3474 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.45 
Bankruptcy risk 3474 6.67 23.3 3.17 1.97 5.22 0.06 469.06 
LN (Assets) 3474 8.12 1.44 8.04 7.16 9.19 3.41 11.35 
Performance (RET) 3474 0.16 0.46 0.11 –0.09 0.32 –0.88 3.68 
Book to market ratio 3474 0.62 0.51 0.49 0.35 0.72 0.00 7.41 
Idiosyncratic risk 2742 1.22 0.92 1.13 0.57 1.83 -0.84 4.25 
CEO = 1   677        
CFO = 1   675        
OTHER EXECUTIVES = 1 2122        
Shareholder Activism = 1   170        
Shareholder Activism = 0 3304        
Table 3 presents summary statistics and statistical distribution of independent and control 
variables used in testing hypotheses.  Panel A presents full sample and Panel B presents non-
family firms only subsample.  See Appendix D for variable descriptions. 
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TABLE 4 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
 Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 (1) RSU ratio 1.000 
      
 (2) Cash Ratio –0.141* 1.000 
     
 (3) Corporate Marginal tax rate  
(At Grant Year) 
–0.079* –0.032* 1.000 
    
 (4) Corporate Marginal tax rate 
(At vesting year, t +3) 
–0.071* 0.008 0.653* 1.000 
   
 (5) Managerial Power –0.051* 0.154* –0.034* 0.030 1.000 
  
 (6) Executive Pay Slice 0.000 –0.237* –0.004 –0.005 0.004 1.000 
 
 (7) Cash constraint –0.032* –0.121* –0.058* –0.120* –0.026 0.006 1.000 
 (8) Dividend payout 0.348* 0.072* –0.051* –0.031 0.210* 0.000 0.066* 
 (9) Earnings volatility –0.102* 0.006 –0.054* –0.070* –0.102* 0.002 0.009 
(10) Stock Volatility –0.136* 0.020 0.093* 0.056* 0.076* –0.009 0.066* 
(11) Bankruptcy risk –0.110* –0.003 –0.024 –0.050* –0.028 0.000 0.144* 
(12) LN (Assets) 0.250* –0.309* 0.198* 0.200* 0.039* –0.008 –0.054* 
(13) Performance (RET) –0.058* 0.009 0.042* 0.105* 0.004 –0.001 –0.082* 
(14) Book to market ratio –0.027 –0.025 –0.133* –0.171* –0.011 0.004 0.004 
 
 Variables  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
 (1) RSU ratio        
 (2) Cash Ratio        
 (3) Corporate Marginal tax 
rate  
(At Grant Year)        
 (4) Corporate Marginal tax 
rate  
(At vesting year, t +3)        
 (5) Managerial Power        
 (6) Executive Pay Slice        
 (7) Cash constraint        
 (8) Dividend payout 1.000       
 (9) Earnings volatility – 0.152* 1.000      
(10) Stock Volatility – 0.167* 0.048* 1.000     
(11) Bankruptcy risk – 0.114* 0.040* 0.023 1.000    
(12) LN (Assets) 0.130* – 0.213* – 0.105* – 0.270* 1.000   
(13) Performance (RET) – 0.079* 0.090* – 0.012 0.008 – 0.074* 1.000  
(14) Book to market ratio – 0.052* 0.068* 0.250* – 0.116* 0.030 – 0.217* 1.000 
 
This table reports Pearson’s correlation matrix among explanatory and explained variables used in 
testing hypotheses.  Correlations with p-value less than 0.05 are indicated with stars.  See Appendix D 
for variable descriptions. 
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TABLE 5 Executive Equity Compensation Structure (RSU Ratio) Across Corporate Tax 
Statuses  
 
 Full sample (n=3,983) Non Family firm sample (n=3474) 
 HIGH_TAX_V=1 LOW_TAX_V=1 HIGH_TAX_V=1 LOW_TAX_V=1 
N 1558 2425 1265 2209 
Mean 0.458 0.422 0.467 0.436 
Median 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Standard Deviation 0.377 0.380 0.383 0.383 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25th Percentile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
75th Percentile 0.750 0.750 0.767 0.750 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of RSU ratio across high corporate tax and low corporate tax 
statuses for the full sample as well as for non-family firm subsample.  See Appendix B for variable 
descriptions. 
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TABLE 6 The Relation Between Executive Equity Compensation Structure and Corporate Tax 
Status and Managerial Power Using an OLS Model RSU_ratiom,n,o = 	 β¹ + βtCorporate	Tax	Planning	Proxym,n,oXq + βManagerial	Powerm,n,o^t 	+ βqCorporate	Tax	Planning	Proxym,n,oXq ∗ Managerial	Powerm,n,o^t+` βm	ControlsÞmcß + εm,n,o 
  Full sample 
Non-family owned firm 
subsample 
Dependent variable: RSU ratio  Coefficient t-stats Coefficient t-stats 
Intercept  – 0.363*** [– 8.12] – 0.368*** [– 7.39] 
HIGH_TAX_V + + 0.055*** [+ 2.70] + 0.054*** [+ 2.38] 
Managerial Power (POWER) –  – 0.056*** [– 8.01] – 0.045*** [– 6.22] 
HIGH_TAX_V*POWER –  + 0.020** [+ 1.84] + 0.021** [+ 1.78] 
Executive Pay Slice (EPS) –  + 0.048 [+ 0.89] + 0.053 [+ 0.91] 
HIGH_TAX_V*EPS –  – 0.067 [– 0.78] – 0.058 [– 0.61] 
Cash Constraint –  + 0.044 [+ 0.63] – 0.013 [– 0.16] 
Dividend Payout + + 5.590*** [+ 21.50] + 5.159*** [+18.74] 
Earnings Volatility ? – 0.428* [– 1.61] – 0.141 [– 0.48] 
Stock Volatility –  – 0.199 [– 1.13] – 0.145 [– 0.72] 
Bankruptcy Risk + – 0.001** [– 2.15] – 0.000** [– 1.89] 
Natural Log (Assets) +  + 0.048*** [11.81] + 0.052*** [+11.72] 
Stock Performance + – 0.020** [– 1.81] – 0.029*** [– 2.15] 
Book to Market Ratio – – 0.029*** [– 2.70] – 0.036*** [– 2.99] 
Year controls  Yes  Yes  
Industry control  Yes  Yes  
Firm fixed effects  No  No  
Number of observations  3983  3474  
R-Squared  0.359  0.363  
Adjusted R-squared  0.353  0.356  
Root mean square error  0.305  0.308  
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Columns 
(1)–(2) contain the results of OLS regression model. The t-statistics shown in brackets are based on OLS 
standard errors.  The dependent variable RSU ratio measure is defined as [Tax Deductible RSU grants /(Tax 
Deductible RSU grants + Employee Tax-favoured Stock Option grants].  The expected corporate tax status 
at vesting year detailed in Section 5 is used as a corporate tax planning proxy.  This proxy measures the 
change in RSU ratio for the change in corporate tax status from low to high.  The managerial power proxy is 
measured as a principal component analysis of the board-related variables and executive pay slice described 
in Section 5.4.  This proxy measures the change in RSU ratio for a change in managerial power.  The sample 
consists of 3,983 (3474) executive-year observations from 2006 to 2015 for full sample (non-family firms).  
The control variables for this model are described in Appendix D.  Coefficients on 15 industry indicator 
variables and 9-year indicator variables are not shown. 
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TABLE 7 The Relation Between Executive Equity Compensation Structure and Corporate Tax 
Status and Managerial Power Using a Firm Fixed Effects Model RSU_ratiom,n,o = 	 β¹ + βtCorporate	Tax	Planning	Proxym,n,oXq + βManagerial	Powerm,n,o^t 	+ βqCorporate	Tax	Planning	Proxym,n,oXq ∗ Managerial	Powerm,n,o^t +` βm	ControlsÞmcß+ εm,n,o 
  Full Sample Non-family run firm subsample 
Dependent variable: RSU ratio  Coefficient t-stats Coefficient t-stats 
Intercept  – 0.156* [– 1.63] – 0.147* [– 1.52] 
HIGH_TAX_V + + 0.043*** [+ 2.65] + 0.012 [+ 0.68] 
Managerial Power (POWER) –  – 0.036*** [– 5.32] – 0.030*** [– 4.38] 
HIGH_TAX_V*POWER –  – 0.010 [– 1.04] – 0.021*** [– 2.02] 
Executive Pay Slice (EPS) –  + 0.049* [+ 1.30] + 0.048 [+ 1.23] 
HIGH_TAX_V*EPS –  – 0.049 [– 0.83] -0.019 [– 0.29] 
Cash Constraint –  – 0.063 [– 0.90] – 0.120* [– 1.58] 
Dividend Payout + + 3.019*** [+ 8.50] + 2.664*** [+ 7.19] 
Earnings Volatility ? – 2.125*** [– 5.99] – 2.532*** [– 6.67] 
Stock Volatility –  – 0.048 [– 0.30] – 0.097 [– 0.57] 
Bankruptcy Risk + + 0.000* [– 1.39] + 0.000* [– 1.55] 
Natural Log (Assets) +  + 0.019* [+ 1.46] + 0.019* [+ 1.43] 
Stock Performance + – 0.036*** [– 4.41] – 0.048*** [– 4.96] 
Book to Market Ratio – – 0.040*** [– 4.48] – 0.034*** [–3.48] 
Year controls  Yes  Yes  
Industry control  Yes  Yes  
Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations  3983  3474  
R-Squared  0.705  0.720  
Adjusted R-squared  0.694  0.709  
Root mean square error  0.210  0.207  
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Columns (1)–(2) contain the results of a firm fixed effects model over 2006-2015. The t-statistics 
shown in brackets are based on bootstrap standard errors, one tailed when sign of the coefficient is 
predicted, and two-tailed otherwise.  The dependent variable RSU ratio measure is defined as [Tax 
Deductible RSU grants /(Tax Deductible RSU grants + Employee Tax-favoured Stock Option grants].  
The expected corporate tax status at vesting year detailed in Section 5 is used as a corporate tax 
planning proxy.  This proxy measures the change in RSU ratio for the change in corporate tax status 
from low to high.  The managerial power proxy is measured as a principal component analysis of the 
board-related variables and executive pay slice described in Section 5.4.  This proxy measures the 
change in RSU ratio for a change in managerial power.  The sample consists of 3,983 (3474) 
executive-year observations from 2006 to 2015 for full sample (non-family firms).  The control 
variables for this model are described in Appendix D.  Coefficients on 15 industry indicator variables 
and 9-year indicator variables are not shown. 
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TABLE 8 Executive Equity Compensation Structure (RSU Ratio) Across Corporate Tax 
Statuses and Managerial Power Levels for a Non-Family Firm Subsample 
(n=3,474) 
 TOP_TAX LOW_TAX HIGH_POWER LOW_POWER HIGH_EPS LOW_EPS 
N 694 2780 693 2781 694 2780 
Mean 0.359 0.469 0.457 0.445 0.474 0.441 
Median 0.407 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Standard Deviation 0.357 0.387 0.416 0.375 0.384 0.383 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25th Percentile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
75th Percentile 0.617 0.760 1.000 0.750 0.755 0.750 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Table 8 presents the summary statistics of RSU ratio across high tax and low tax statuses, high power 
and low power, and high EPS and low EPS.  The expected corporate marginal tax rate at vesting year 
(MTR_V) detailed in Section 5 is used as a corporate tax planning proxy.  I reclassify TOP_TAX =1 
if MTR_V is in the top quintile and zero otherwise.   
 
The managerial power proxy is measured as a principal component analysis of the board-related 
variables and executive pay slice described in Section 5.4.  HIGH_POWER=1 if POWER is in the top 
quintile and zero otherwise.  The HIGH_POWER proxy measures the change in RSU ratio for a 
change in managerial power from low to high.  
 
HIGH_EPS represents an indicator variable.  I classify HIGH_EPS=1 if Executive Pay Slice is in the 
top quintile and zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 9 The Relation Between Executive Equity Compensation Structure and Corporate Tax 
Status and Managerial Power After Reclassifying Expected Corporate Marginal Tax 
Rate and Managerial Power Variables as Indicator Variables RSU_ratiom,n,o = 	 β¹ + βtTOP_TAXm,n,oXq + βqHIGH_POWERm,n,o^t +	βßTOP_TAXm,n,oXq ∗ HIGH_POWERm,n,o^t+` βm	ControlsÞmcâ + εm,n,o 
Equation (2) 
 
  Non-family run firm subsample 
Dependent variable: RSU ratio  Coefficient t-stats 
Intercept  -0.171** [-1.78] 
TOP_TAX + +0.007 [+0.43] 
HIGH_POWER –  -0.020* [-1.28] 
TOP_TAX*HIGH_POWER –  -0.081*** [-3.24] 
HIGH_EPS –  +0.020** [+1.95] 
TOP_TAX*HIGH_EPS –  -0.004 [-0.19] 
Cash Constraint –  -0.132** [-1.73] 
Dividend Payout + +2.544*** [+6.80] 
Earnings Volatility ? -2.800*** [-7.35] 
Stock Volatility –  -0.055 [-0.32] 
Bankruptcy Risk + -0.000** [-1.82] 
Natural Log (Assets) +  +0.028*** [+2.13] 
Stock Performance + -0.049*** [-5.10] 
Book to Market Ratio – -0.037*** [-3.79] 
Year controls  Yes  
Industry control  Yes  
Firm fixed effects  Yes  
Executive fixed effects  No  
Number of observations  3474  
R-Squared  0.718  
Adjusted R-squared  0.707  
Root mean square error  0.208  
Continued on next page: 
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TABLE 9 (Continued) 
 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Columns (1) contains the results of a fixed effects model. The t-statistics shown in brackets are based 
on bootstrap standard errors.  The dependent variable RSU ratio measure is defined as [Tax 
Deductible RSU grants /(Tax Deductible RSU grants + Employee Tax-favoured Stock Option grants].  
The sample consists of 3474 executive-year observations from 2006 to 2015 for non-family firms.   
The control variables for this model are described in Appendix D.   
Coefficients on 15 industry indicator variables and 9-year indicator variables are not shown. 
Main explanatory variables are defined as follows. 
 
The expected corporate marginal tax rate at vesting year (MTR_V) detailed in Section 5.3 is used as a 
corporate tax planning proxy.  I reclassify TOP_TAX =1 if MTR_V is in the top quintile and zero 
otherwise.  The TOP_TAX proxy measures the change in RSU ratio for the change in corporate tax 
status from low to high.   
 
The managerial power proxy is measured as a principal component analysis of the board-related 
variables and executive pay slice described in Section 5.4.  HIGH_POWER=1 if POWER is in the top 
quintile and zero otherwise.  The HIGH_POWER proxy measures the change in RSU ratio for a 
change in managerial power from low to high.  
 
HIGH_EPS represents an indicator variable.  I classify HIGH_EPS=1 if Executive Pay Slice is in the 
top quintile and zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 10 Executive Equity Compensation Structure (RSU Ratio) Across Corporate Tax 
Statuses and Managerial Power Levels for Non-Family Firm CEO, CFO and Other 
Executive Subsamples 
Panel A: CEO subsample (n=677) 
 TOP_TAX LOW_TAX HIGH_POWER LOW_POWER HIGH_EPS LOW_EPS 
N 137 540 131 546 83 594 
Mean 0.368 0.487 0.491 0.456 0.307 0.485 
Median 0.387 0.500 0.526 0.500 0.000 0.500 
Standard Deviation 0.366 0.388 0.417 0.379 0.426 0.376 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25th Percentile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
75th Percentile 0.652 0.773 1.000 0.750 0.667 0.753 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: CFO subsample (n=675) 
 TOP_TAX LOW_TAX HIGH_POWER LOW_POWER HIGH_EPS LOW_EPS 
N 136 539 125 550 16 659 
Mean 0.331 0.468 0.435 0.441 0.207 0.446 
Median 0.364 0.500 0.464 0.500 0.000 0.500 
Standard Deviation 0.345 0.383 0.402 0.374 0.284 0.379 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25th Percentile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
75th Percentile 0.600 0.753 0.758 0.750 0.500 0.750 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.813 1.000 
 
Panel C: Other Executive subsample (n=2126) 
 TOP_TAX LOW_TAX HIGH_POWER LOW_POWER HIGH_EPS LOW_EPS 
N 421 1705 437 1689 85 2041 
Mean 0.365 0.464 0.454 0.442 0.446 0.444 
Median 0.427 0.500 0.479 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Standard Deviation 0.359 0.387 0.420 0.374 0.437 0.382 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25th Percentile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
75th Percentile 0.632 0.763 1.000 0.750 1.000 0.750 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Table 10 presents the summary statistics of RSU ratio across different groups of executives, i.e., CEOs, CFOs 
and Other executives.  The comparisons are made based on high tax and low tax statuses, high power and low 
power, and high EPS and low EPS.  The expected corporate marginal tax rate at vesting year (MTR_V) detailed 
in Section 5.3 is used as a corporate tax planning proxy.  I reclassify TOP_TAX =1 if MTR_V is in the top 
quintile and zero otherwise.   
 
The managerial power proxy is measured as a principal component analysis of the board-related variables and 
executive pay slice described in Section 5.4.  HIGH_POWER=1 if POWER is in the top quintile and zero 
otherwise.  The HIGH_POWER proxy measures the change in RSU ratio for a change in managerial power 
from low to high.  
 
HIGH_EPS represents an indicator variable.  I classify HIGH_EPS=1 if Executive Pay Slice is in the top 
quintile and zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 11 The Relation Between Executive Equity Compensation Structure and Corporate 
Tax Planning and Managerial Power Using a Subsample of CEOs, CFOs and Other 
Executives RSU_ratiom,n,o = 	 β¹ + βtTOP_TAXm,n,oXq + βqHIGH_POWERm,n,o^t +	βßTOP_TAXm,n,oXq ∗ HIGH_POWERm,n,o^t+` βm	ControlsÞmcâ + εm,n,o 
Equation (2) 
 
  CEOs   CFOs  Others  
Dependent variable: RSU ratio  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Intercept – 0.356 [– 1.46] – 0.303 [– 1.33] + 0.001 [+0.01] 
TOP_TAX + – 0.057 [– 0.65] + 0.002 [+0.05] + 0.014 [+0.77] 
HIGH_POWER –  – 0.004 [– 0.11] – 0.040 [– 1.12] – 0.020 [– 1.04] 
TOP_TAX*HIGH_POWER –  – 0.082* [– 1.33] – 0.098** [– 1.65] – 0.070*** [– 2.25] 
HIGH_EPS –  – 0.052 [– 1.18] – 0.069 [– 0.95] + 0.089*** [+3.41] 
TOP_TAX*HIGH_EPS –  + 0.039 [+ 0.46] – 0.086 [– 0.57] + 0.015 [+0.22] 
Cash Constraint – – 0.268* [– 1.39] – 0.145 [– 0.81] – 0.072 [– 0.75] 
Dividend Payout + + 2.907*** [+ 3.07] + 2.902*** [+3.44] + 2.241*** [+4.74] 
Earnings Volatility ? – 2.622*** [– 2.57] – 2.482*** [– 2.63] – 2.987*** [– 6.42] 
Stock Volatility – + 0.158 [+ 0.34] – 0.463 [– 1.07] – 0.006 [– 0.03] 
Bankruptcy Risk + – 0.001 [– 0.89] + 0.000 [– 0.75] + 0.000* [– 1.32] 
Natural Log (Assets) +  + 0.061** [+ 1.82] + 0.035 [+1.14] + 0.005 [+0.32] 
Stock Performance + – 0.038* [– 1.52] – 0.054** [– 2.36] – 0.052*** [– 4.29] 
Book to Market Ratio – – 0.027 [– 1.12] – 0.016 [– 0.64] – 0.043*** [– 3.52] 
Year controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Industry control  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Number of observations  677  675  2126 
 
R-Squared  0.717  0.753  0.736 
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.650  0.695  0.719 
 
Root mean square error  0.228  0.209  0.203 
 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Columns (1)–(3) 
contain the results of a firm fixed effects model. The t-statistics shown in brackets are based on bootstrap 
standard errors.  The dependent variable RSU ratio measure is defined as [Tax Deductible RSU grants /(Tax 
Deductible RSU grants + Employee Tax-favoured Stock Option grants].  The expected corporate tax status at 
vesting year detailed in Section 5.3 is used as a corporate tax planning proxy.  This proxy measures the change 
in RSU ratio for the change in corporate tax status from low to high.  The managerial power proxy is measured 
as a principal component analysis of the board-related variables and executive pay slice described in Section 
5.4.  This proxy measures the change in RSU ratio for a change in managerial power.  The sample consists of 
677 (675) (2126) executive-year observations from 2006 to 2015 for CEOs only sample (CFOs only sample) 
(other executives) from non-family firms.  The control variables for this model are described in Appendix D.  
Coefficients on 15 industry indicator variables and 9-year indicator variables are not shown. 
 125 
TABLE 12 Executive Equity Compensation Structure (RSU Ratio) Across Corporate Tax 
Statues and Managerial Power Levels for a Reduced Non-Family Firm Subsample 
(n=2,712) 
 TOP_TAX LOW_TAX HIGH_POWER LOW_POWER HIGH_EPS LOW_EPS 
N 434 2278 552 2160 542 2170 
Mean 0.435 0.512 0.528 0.492 0.524 0.494 
Median 0.496 0.521 0.633 0.500 0.548 0.505 
Standard Deviation 0.356 0.382 0.410 0.370 0.377 0.379 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25th Percentile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
75th Percentile 0.749 0.828 1.000 0.754 0.825 0.775 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Table 12 presents the summary statistics of RSU ratio of non-family firms executives.  The comparisons are 
made based on high tax and low tax statuses, high power and low power, and high EPS and low EPS.  The 
expected corporate marginal tax rate at vesting year (MTR_V) detailed in Section 5.3 is used as a corporate tax 
planning proxy.  I reclassify TOP_TAX =1 if MTR_V is in the top quintile and zero otherwise.   
 
The managerial power proxy is measured as a principal component analysis of the board-related variables and 
executive pay slice described in Section 5.4.  HIGH_POWER=1 if POWER is in the top quintile and zero 
otherwise.  The HIGH_POWER proxy measures the change in RSU ratio for a change in managerial power 
from low to high.  
 
HIGH_EPS represents an indicator variable.  I classify HIGH_EPS=1 if Executive Pay Slice is in the top 
quintile and zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 13 The Relation Between Executive Equity Compensation Structure and Corporate Tax 
Planning and Managerial Power After Controlling for Idiosyncratic Risk and Shareholder 
Activism RSU_ratiom,n,o = 	 β¹ + βtTOP_TAXm,n,oXq + βqHIGH_POWERm,n,o^t +	βßTOP_TAXm,n,oXq ∗ HIGH_POWERm,n,o^t+` βm	ControlsÞmcâ + εm,n,o 
Equation (2) 
  Controlling for Idiosyncratic risk With Shareholder Activism 
Dependent variable: RSU ratio  Coefficient t-stats Coefficient t-stats 
Intercept  + 0.413*** [+3.09] + 0.402*** [+3.01] 
TOP_TAX + + 0.001 [+0.07] + 0.003 [+0.15] 
HIGH_POWER –  – 0.052*** [– 2.97] – 0.052*** [– 2.96] 
TOP_TAX*HIGH_POWER –  – 0.057** [– 1.92] – 0.056** [– 1.89] 
HIGH_EPS –  + 0.016* [+1.54] + 0.016* [+1.53] 
TOP_TAX*HIGH_EPS –  + 0.001 [+0.04] + 0.001 [+0.04] 
Cash Constraint – – 0.378*** [– 3.72] – 0.375*** [– 3.69] 
Dividend Payout + + 3.274*** [+8.18] + 3.316*** [+8.28] 
Earnings Volatility ? – 4.644*** [– 7.07] – 4.610*** [– 7.02] 
Stock Volatility – – 1.706*** [– 6.38] – 1.637*** [– 6.08] 
Bankruptcy Risk + + 0.000 [– 0.39] + 0.000 [– 0.36] 
Natural Log (Assets) +  – 0.021* [– 1.29] – 0.021 [– 1.24] 
Stock Performance + – 0.058*** [– 5.40] – 0.058*** [– 5.38] 
Book to Market Ratio – – 0.051*** [– 3.25] – 0.052*** [– 3.30] 
Idiosyncratic Risk + + 0.024** [+1.75] + 0.024** [+1.80] 
Shareholder Activism +    + 0.043** [+2.01] 
Year controls  Yes  Yes  
Industry control  Yes  Yes  
Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations  2712  2712  
R-Squared  0.737  0.737  
Adjusted R-squared  0.725  0.725  
Root mean square error  0.199  0.199  
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Columns (1)–(2) 
contain the results of a firm fixed effects model over 2006-2015. The t-statistics shown in brackets are based on 
bootstrap standard errors, one tailed when sign of the coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed otherwise.  The 
dependent variable RSU ratio measure is defined as [Tax Deductible RSU grants /(Tax Deductible RSU grants 
+ Employee Tax-favoured Stock Option grants].  The expected corporate tax status at vesting year detailed in 
Chapter 5 is used as a corporate tax planning proxy.  This proxy measures the change in RSU ratio for the 
change in corporate tax status from low to high.  The managerial power proxy is measured as a principal 
component analysis of the board-related variables and executive pay slice described in Section 5.4.  This proxy 
measures the change in RSU ratio for a change in managerial power.  The sample consists of 2,712 executive-
year observations from 2006 to 2015 for non-family firms.  The control variables for this model are described in 
Appendix D.  Coefficients on 15 industry indicator variables and 9-year indicator variables are not shown. 
